{"title":"The Administration of Criminal Justice Act and the Extinguishment of Trial de Novo in Nigeria: Far From Being Settled?","authors":"D. Eyongndi","doi":"10.3366/ajicl.2022.0415","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the current innovation introduced by the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) in the trial of criminal cases which has purportedly extinguished trial de novo. It argues that based on extant case law and the provisions of the Constitution, section 396(7) of the ACJA is null and void, therefore it cannot achieve the intended purpose. This article adopts doctrinal research methodology focusing on the meaning and circumstances in which trial de novo would be invoked and its legal implications as well as the difference between trial de novo and appeal. It argues that unless the Constitution that creates the courts is amended as contemplated under section 9 thereof, the purported extinction of trial de novo by the ACJA cannot be achieved despite the good intention as the elevation to High Court judge robs him of jurisdiction to preside over a dispute as a trial judge. It found that the ACJA does not envisage cases of retirement and death of a trial judge or magistrate which are causes of trial de novo. It identifies alternatives to trial de novo under the 2011 Evidence Act and makes a case for their adoption as done by the Indian courts. It recommends that the relevant sections of the Constitution be amended wherein the mischief sought to be cured by the ACJA can then be legally achieved just as it was in the case of the National Industrial Court via the 1999 CFRN (Third Alteration) Act 2010.","PeriodicalId":42692,"journal":{"name":"African Journal of International and Comparative Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"African Journal of International and Comparative Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3366/ajicl.2022.0415","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
This article discusses the current innovation introduced by the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) in the trial of criminal cases which has purportedly extinguished trial de novo. It argues that based on extant case law and the provisions of the Constitution, section 396(7) of the ACJA is null and void, therefore it cannot achieve the intended purpose. This article adopts doctrinal research methodology focusing on the meaning and circumstances in which trial de novo would be invoked and its legal implications as well as the difference between trial de novo and appeal. It argues that unless the Constitution that creates the courts is amended as contemplated under section 9 thereof, the purported extinction of trial de novo by the ACJA cannot be achieved despite the good intention as the elevation to High Court judge robs him of jurisdiction to preside over a dispute as a trial judge. It found that the ACJA does not envisage cases of retirement and death of a trial judge or magistrate which are causes of trial de novo. It identifies alternatives to trial de novo under the 2011 Evidence Act and makes a case for their adoption as done by the Indian courts. It recommends that the relevant sections of the Constitution be amended wherein the mischief sought to be cured by the ACJA can then be legally achieved just as it was in the case of the National Industrial Court via the 1999 CFRN (Third Alteration) Act 2010.