VI. In Space, No One Will See You Fight

Abstract

In 2019, the establishment of the US Space Force as an independent military service reignited various long-running debates on the nature of future conflict in space. While specialists in military space policy understood the formation of Space Force as a reorganisation of existing capabilities and missions, other narratives soon emerged in the broader security and defence sphere. Most centred on fears of direct kinetic conflict and increasing weaponisation of assets in orbit; high-powered space lasers which could target enemy satellites, military bases on the Moon, and the spectre of ‘space marines’ in the shape of armed service personnel routinely being deployed in orbit. Beyond providing a target for political commentators and late-night comedy show hosts, these narratives distract attention from the real and important issues raised by likely confrontation in the space domain during future conflicts. Specifically, it is necessary to counter the idea that kinetic warfare in space will be a central and early feature of future state-on-state wars. The idea of kinetic conflict in space is not new. It became apparent during the late 1950s that satellites could provide enabling capabilities for terrestrial military operations. Consequently, both the US and the Soviet