{"title":"Causal Exclusion and Causal Autonomism","authors":"Cai Weixin","doi":"10.3868/s030-007-018-0031-3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The causal exclusion problem is often considered as one of the major difficulties for which non-reductive physicalists have no easy solution to offer. Some non-reductive physicalists address this problem by arguing that mental properties are to some extent causally autonomous. If this is the case, then mental properties will not be causally excluded by their physical realizers because causation, in general, is a relation between properties of the same level. In this paper, I argue that the response from causal autonomy cannot be successful for two reasons. First, it does not offer a satisfactory explanation for how mental particulars can have causal efficacy in a non-reductive physicalist framework. Second, the causal considerations underpinning this response do not really support the conclusion that mental properties are causally autonomous.","PeriodicalId":42530,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers of Philosophy in China","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2018-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3868/s030-007-018-0031-3","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Frontiers of Philosophy in China","FirstCategoryId":"1095","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-007-018-0031-3","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The causal exclusion problem is often considered as one of the major difficulties for which non-reductive physicalists have no easy solution to offer. Some non-reductive physicalists address this problem by arguing that mental properties are to some extent causally autonomous. If this is the case, then mental properties will not be causally excluded by their physical realizers because causation, in general, is a relation between properties of the same level. In this paper, I argue that the response from causal autonomy cannot be successful for two reasons. First, it does not offer a satisfactory explanation for how mental particulars can have causal efficacy in a non-reductive physicalist framework. Second, the causal considerations underpinning this response do not really support the conclusion that mental properties are causally autonomous.
期刊介绍:
Frontiers of Philosophy in China seeks to provide a forum for a broad blend of peer-reviewed academic papers in order to promote communication and cooperation between philosophers in China and abroad. It is to reflect the remarkable achievements that have been made in Chinese universities in philosophy research. Its coverage includes the following main branches of philosophy: Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy, philosophy of science and technology, political philosophy, history of philosophy, aesthetics, ethics, religion, etc. The journal especially encourages papers related to classical Chinese philosophy and Marxist philosophy and puts special emphasis on exploring the philosophical thoughts of the prominent Chinese philosophers since the period of "Hundred Schools of Thought".