{"title":"The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box By Masaaki Higashijima. 2022. University of Michigan Press. Book Reviews","authors":"Francisco Cantú","doi":"10.1017/S1468109922000342","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Most of the existing explanations for authoritarian elections suffer from two shortcomings. The first one is the generalization of their findings. Single-country cases inspire many of these theories, and it is hard to know whether their proposed predictions apply to other autocracies. The second problem is prevalent in social sciences: there is no cumulative learning. Many theories of authoritarian elections provide competing explanations to the conventional wisdom without delineating the conditions in which the proposed mechanism should appear over the alternatives. Masaaki Higashijima ’ s recent publication, The Dictator ’ s Dilemma at the Ballot Box , overcomes such limitations in a magistral way. The author proposes a solid argument about the incentives for dictators to hold and manipulate elections and provides a multi-methods approach using cross-national evidence to test his argument. The book centers around the competing incentives for dictators when holding elections. On the one hand, honest election results provide information about the regime ’ s popularity, the discontent areas, and local agents ’ competence. Authoritarian elections also allow the opposition to channel its demands through the institutional arena, mitigating the threats to the dictators. On the other, winning by large margins can transmit an aura of invincibility and strong popular support to the dictator inside and outside the ruling elites. In the best","PeriodicalId":44381,"journal":{"name":"Japanese Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Japanese Journal of Political Science","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1468109922000342","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Most of the existing explanations for authoritarian elections suffer from two shortcomings. The first one is the generalization of their findings. Single-country cases inspire many of these theories, and it is hard to know whether their proposed predictions apply to other autocracies. The second problem is prevalent in social sciences: there is no cumulative learning. Many theories of authoritarian elections provide competing explanations to the conventional wisdom without delineating the conditions in which the proposed mechanism should appear over the alternatives. Masaaki Higashijima ’ s recent publication, The Dictator ’ s Dilemma at the Ballot Box , overcomes such limitations in a magistral way. The author proposes a solid argument about the incentives for dictators to hold and manipulate elections and provides a multi-methods approach using cross-national evidence to test his argument. The book centers around the competing incentives for dictators when holding elections. On the one hand, honest election results provide information about the regime ’ s popularity, the discontent areas, and local agents ’ competence. Authoritarian elections also allow the opposition to channel its demands through the institutional arena, mitigating the threats to the dictators. On the other, winning by large margins can transmit an aura of invincibility and strong popular support to the dictator inside and outside the ruling elites. In the best
现有对独裁选举的大多数解释都有两个缺点。第一个是对他们的发现的概括。单一国家的案例激发了许多这样的理论,很难知道他们提出的预测是否适用于其他独裁国家。第二个问题在社会科学中很普遍:没有累积的学习。许多关于独裁选举的理论为传统智慧提供了相互竞争的解释,但没有描述拟议机制应该出现在替代方案之上的条件。东岛正明(Masaaki Higashijima)最近出版的《独裁者在投票箱的困境》(The Dictator’s Dilemma at The Ballot Box)以一种权威的方式克服了这些限制。作者就独裁者举行和操纵选举的动机提出了一个坚实的论点,并提供了一种使用跨国家证据来检验他的论点的多种方法。这本书围绕着独裁者在举行选举时相互竞争的动机展开。一方面,诚实的选举结果提供了有关政权受欢迎程度、不满地区和地方代理人能力的信息。威权主义选举还允许反对派通过体制舞台传递其要求,减轻对独裁者的威胁。另一方面,以较大优势获胜可以将不可战胜的光环和强大的民众支持传递给统治精英内外的独裁者。在最好的
期刊介绍:
The Japanese Journal of Political Science is a broadly based journal aiming to cover developments across a wide range of countries and specialisms. Its scope is wide-ranging both in terms of subject matter and method. The journal features articles in all fields of political science, especially where these have a conceptual thrust including political theory, comparative politics, political behaviour, political institutions, public policy, and international relations. At the same time, the journal seeks to attract the best comparative articles featuring both the domestic and international politics of Japan and East Asia. Each issue contains full length research articles, review articles and book reviews.