{"title":"It’s not just where you stand, it’s how you got there: social pacts and manual worker support for radical right-wing parties","authors":"K. Han, Eric Graig Castater","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2021.1973214","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\n We utilize the literature on social pacts to argue that governments can reduce manual worker support for the radical right by engaging in an inclusive process of decision-making with unions. Our analysis examines 11 Western European countries between 1999 and 2017 and employs a Heckman selection model. We find that when left or mainstream right governments complete social pact agreements, manual workers become less likely to support radical right-wing parties (RRPs); but when such governments fail to convert social pact proposals into social pact agreements, manual workers become more likely to support RRPs. We also find that social pact agreements have a greater effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under mainstream right governments, but that failed social pact proposals have a greater effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under left governments; and that the social pact formation process matters more for the RRP support of manual workers who belong to a union than those who do not. Our results suggest that manual worker support for the radical right is not only a function of issue voting or socioeconomic and policy outcomes, but also features of the policymaking process.","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"24 1","pages":"188 - 212"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Politics and Society","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2021.1973214","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
ABSTRACT
We utilize the literature on social pacts to argue that governments can reduce manual worker support for the radical right by engaging in an inclusive process of decision-making with unions. Our analysis examines 11 Western European countries between 1999 and 2017 and employs a Heckman selection model. We find that when left or mainstream right governments complete social pact agreements, manual workers become less likely to support radical right-wing parties (RRPs); but when such governments fail to convert social pact proposals into social pact agreements, manual workers become more likely to support RRPs. We also find that social pact agreements have a greater effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under mainstream right governments, but that failed social pact proposals have a greater effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under left governments; and that the social pact formation process matters more for the RRP support of manual workers who belong to a union than those who do not. Our results suggest that manual worker support for the radical right is not only a function of issue voting or socioeconomic and policy outcomes, but also features of the policymaking process.
期刊介绍:
The editors of European Politics and Society welcome the submission of high quality articles on all aspects of European Politics, widely defined to include, comparative politics, political sociology, social policy, international relations, security, and modern history. The geographical scope of the journal covers all parts of Europe including the Russian Federation. The Journal also welcomes proposals for special thematic issues. For further guidelines on submission of special issue proposals, please see the Instructions for Authors page. All articles will be subject to a rigorous double-blind peer review process by a minimum of two referees.