Thinking Outside the (Traditional) Boxes of Moral Luck

IF 0.5 0 PHILOSOPHY Midwest Studies in Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-07-24 DOI:10.1111/MISP.12101
D. Nelkin
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

The very idea of moral luck poses a puzzle. In fact, Bernard Williams, who introduced the phrase “moral luck,” writes that he “expected to suggest an oxymoron” (Williams 1993: 251). As I will understand it here, moral luck occurs when an agent can be correctly treated as an object of moral judgment, despite the fact that a significant aspect of what he is assessed for depends on factors beyond his control (Nagel 1979). Williams (1981) had suggested that the idea of luck—or being outside of our control—is simply inconsistent with the idea of moral assessment. The more specific claim that will be the focus here is that the idea of luck is inconsistent with a particular form of moral assessment, namely, moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. And in fact, I will focus on a specific kind of moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, namely, that associated with moral responsibility understood as accountability. In this sense of responsibility, we are responsible agents insofar as we are subjects of legitimate moral demands and apt candidates for being held to account when it comes to meeting those demands.1
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跳出(传统)道德运气的框框思考
道德运气的概念本身就构成了一个谜。事实上,引入“道德运气”一词的伯纳德·威廉姆斯(Bernard Williams)写道,他“希望提出一种矛盾修辞法”(Williams 1993: 251)。正如我在这里所理解的那样,当一个行为人可以被正确地视为道德判断的对象时,道德运气就发生了,尽管他被评估的一个重要方面取决于他无法控制的因素(Nagel 1979)。Williams(1981)认为运气的概念——或者说是我们无法控制的东西——与道德评价的概念是不一致的。这里要讨论的更具体的观点是运气的概念与一种特定形式的道德评价不一致,即道德上的可谴责性和可赞扬性。事实上,我将重点关注一种特定的道德上的可谴责性和可赞扬性,也就是说,与道德责任相关的道德责任被理解为责任。在这种责任感中,我们是负责任的行动者,因为我们是合法道德要求的主体,并且在满足这些要求时,我们是负责任的候选人
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来源期刊
Midwest Studies in Philosophy
Midwest Studies in Philosophy Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.70
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0.00%
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0
期刊介绍: Midwest Studies in Philosophy presents important thinking on a single topic in philosophy with each volume. Influential contributors bring provocative and varying ideas to the theme at hand. Recent volumes of Midwest Studies in Philosophy include Truth and its Deformities, Philosophy and the Empirical, Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility, and Free Will and Moral Responsibility.
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