Congestion Game With Agent and Resource Failures

IF 13.8 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications Pub Date : 2017-03-01 DOI:10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672358
Yupeng Li, Yongzheng Jia, Haisheng Tan, Rui Wang, Zhenhua Han, F. Lau
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

Motivated by practical scenarios, we study congestion games with failures. We investigate two models. The first model is congestion games with both resource and agent failures, where each agent chooses the same number of resources with the minimum expected cost. We prove that the game is potential and hence admits at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (pure-NE). We also show that the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability are bounded (equal to 1 in some cases). The second model is congestion games with only resource failures (CG-CRF), where resources are provided in packages, and their failures can be correlated with each other. Each agent can choose multiple packages for reliability’s sake and utilize the survived one having the minimum cost. CG-CRF is shown to be not potential. We prove that it admits at least one pure-NE by constructing one efficiently. Finally, we discuss various applications of these two games in the networking field. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper studying congestion games with the coexistence of resource and agent failures, and we give also the first proof of the existence of a pure-NE in congestion games with correlated package failures.
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具有代理和资源故障的拥塞博弈
在实际场景的激励下,我们研究了带有失败的拥堵博弈。我们研究了两个模型。第一个模型是资源和代理都失败的拥塞博弈,其中每个代理以最小的预期成本选择相同数量的资源。我们证明了博弈是潜在的,因此至少存在一个纯策略纳什均衡(pure-NE)。我们还证明了无政府状态的价格和稳定的价格是有界的(在某些情况下等于1)。第二种模式是只有资源失败的拥塞游戏(CG-CRF),其中资源以包的形式提供,并且它们的失败可以相互关联。出于可靠性考虑,每个代理可以选择多个包,并使用成本最低的幸存包。CG-CRF显示为非电位。我们通过构造一个有效的纯ne来证明它至少存在一个纯ne。最后,我们讨论了这两个游戏在网络领域的各种应用。据我们所知,这是第一篇研究资源和代理故障共存的拥塞博弈的论文,并且我们也首次证明了在具有相关包故障的拥塞博弈中存在纯ne。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
30.00
自引率
4.30%
发文量
234
审稿时长
6 months
期刊介绍: The IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC) is a prestigious journal that covers various topics related to Computer Networks and Communications (Q1) as well as Electrical and Electronic Engineering (Q1). Each issue of JSAC is dedicated to a specific technical topic, providing readers with an up-to-date collection of papers in that area. The journal is highly regarded within the research community and serves as a valuable reference. The topics covered by JSAC issues span the entire field of communications and networking, with recent issue themes including Network Coding for Wireless Communication Networks, Wireless and Pervasive Communications for Healthcare, Network Infrastructure Configuration, Broadband Access Networks: Architectures and Protocols, Body Area Networking: Technology and Applications, Underwater Wireless Communication Networks, Game Theory in Communication Systems, and Exploiting Limited Feedback in Tomorrow’s Communication Networks.
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