The Caribbean Community’s inconsistent record on democratisation

Abstract

Within the Commonwealth, few collections of states encompass such a democratic grouping as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Established in 1973, 13 of its 14 sovereign members are considered open, liberal democracies that hold regular free and fair elections and respect most civil liberties. Given their liberal-democratic nature, it is plausible to think that CARICOM states would honour their democratic commitments, exemplified in the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) and Charter of Civil Society, to steadfastly condemn instances of autocratic reversions. This school of thought is in line with liberal and constructivist theories in International Relations. The former expects democracies’ unwavering commitment to cooperate against common authoritarian challenges. The latter maintains that well-established regional democratic norms would compel signatories to abide by those principles and values. The reality, regrettably, is different. Far from being reliable democratic allies, CARICOM states are hesitant partners who would side with autocracies or democracies, depending on their own material and political interests, not their democratic character and identity. Take Venezuela’s authoritarian regime first. Amid domestic protests against the Nicolás Maduro regime in 2014, the Organization of American States (OAS) attempted to convene a meeting to discuss human rights violations in Venezuela. Unsurprisingly, Maduro got his way by blocking the meeting from occurring and approving instead an ineffectual declaration insulating his regime from any democratising measure with the support of 12 CARICOM democracies. However, after fiercely repressed protests in 2017, the OAS took a more active approach to promote democratisation in Venezuela, thanks to the support of several CARICOM states. They supported a 2018 resolution asserting that Venezuela’s presidential elections ‘lack[ed] legitimacy’ and reaffirming the country’s ‘unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional order.’ Remarkably different from previous years, Maduro only garnered the unfaltering support of five highly democratic Caribbean nations: Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines. Distinctly, the