Moral Rationalism on the Brain

IF 1.8 3区 心理学 Q1 LINGUISTICS Mind & Language Pub Date : 2021-07-08 DOI:10.31234/osf.io/psefm
Joshua May
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

I draw on neurobiological evidence to defend the rationalist thesis that moral judgments are essentially dependent on reasoning, not emotions (conceived as distinct from inference). The neuroscience reveals that moral cognition arises from domain-general capacities in the brain for inferring, in particular, the consequences of an agent’s action, the agent’s intent, and the rules or norms relevant to the context. Although these capacities entangle inference and affect, blurring the reason/emotion dichotomy doesn’t preferentially support sentimentalism. The argument requires careful consideration of the empirical evidence (from neuroimaging to psychopathology) and philosophical analysis of the commitments of rationalism versus sentimentalism in ethics.
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大脑中的道德理性主义
我利用神经生物学证据为理性主义的论点辩护,即道德判断本质上取决于推理,而不是情绪(被认为与推理不同)。神经科学表明,道德认知源于大脑的一般能力,特别是推断代理人行为的后果、代理人的意图以及与上下文相关的规则或规范。尽管这些能力将推理和情感纠缠在一起,但模糊理性/情感的二分法并不能优先支持感伤主义。这一论点需要仔细考虑经验证据(从神经影像学到精神病理学),并对伦理学中理性主义与感伤主义的承诺进行哲学分析。
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来源期刊
Mind & Language
Mind & Language Multiple-
CiteScore
4.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
58
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