Introduction

Abstract

In 2017, commentators on Gulf politics focused most of their attention on the effects of US President Donald Trump’s presidency on the region, while in fact diplomatic events in the peninsula were pointing in a different direction, demonstrating the growing strategic ties between Gulf and Asian countries. First, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, crown prince of Abu Dhabi, travelled to Delhi at the end of January, where he was invited as guest of honour to the celebration of India’s Republic Day, a privilege given in the recent past to the former US and French presidents, Barack Obama and François Hollande. The event was followed by the signing of a strategic global partnership between India and the UAE, including over a dozen bilateral agreements ranging from military cooperation to investment in Indian infrastructure. Four weeks later, the ruler of Saudi Arabia, King Salman, embarked on a historical month-long Asia tour that brought him to Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Japan and China. If economic deals were at the top of the agenda – with, for instance, $25 billion in investments contemplated in Indonesia – strategic considerations were also on the table, as Riyadh is eager to increase its counterterrorism cooperation with Muslim countries in Southeast Asia and to reinforce its Islamic Military Alliance (also known as the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition) formed on 15 December 2015. Last, in June 2017, Saudi Arabia, alongside five other countries, announced the cessation of diplomatic relations with Qatar over claims that the small emirate had been sponsoring terrorist organisations. As all eyes turned towards the US, the strongest partner of all the parties involved, the position of the US government soon appeared confused between the Department of State expressing neutrality and President Trump