Error, consistency and triviality

IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY NOUS Pub Date : 2021-06-16 DOI:10.1111/NOUS.12375
Christine Tiefensee, G. Wheeler
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Abstract

In this paper, we present a new semantic challenge to the moral error theory. Its first component calls upon moral error theorists to deliver a deontic semantics that is consistent with the error-theoretic denial of moral truths by returning the truth-value false to all moral deontic sentences. We call this the ‘consistency challenge’ to the moral error theory. Its second component demands that error theorists explain in which way moral deontic assertions can be seen to differ in meaning despite necessarily sharing the same intension. We call this the ‘triviality challenge’ to the moral error theory. Error theorists can either meet the consistency challenge or the triviality challenge, we argue, but are hard pressed to meet both.
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错误,一致性和琐碎
在本文中,我们对道德错误理论提出了新的语义挑战。它的第一个组成部分要求道德错误理论家通过返回所有道德道义句的真值假,来传递一种道义语义,这种语义与错误理论对道德真理的否认是一致的。我们称之为道德错误理论的“一致性挑战”。它的第二个组成部分要求错误理论家解释,道德道义主张在何种意义上可以被视为不同,尽管必然具有相同的内涵。我们称之为道德错误理论的“琐碎性挑战”。我们认为,误差理论学家要么可以满足一致性挑战,要么可以满足琐碎性挑战,但很难同时满足两者。
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来源期刊
NOUS
NOUS PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
5.10
自引率
4.80%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: Noûs, a premier philosophy journal, publishes articles that address the whole range of topics at the center of philosophical debate, as well as long critical studies of important books. Subscribers to Noûs also receive two prestigious annual publications at no additional cost: Philosophical Issues and Philosophical Perspectives.
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