{"title":"Tentativa, error y dolo. Una reformulación normológica de la distinción entre tentativa y delito putativo","authors":"J. Mañalich R.","doi":"10.4067/S0718-33992019000100296","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"espanolEl articulo explora algunas conexiones fundamentales que existen entre la dogmatica de la tentativa y la dogmatica del dolo. El punto de partida para ello se obtiene de la caracterizacion general de la tentativa de delito como una estructura de imputacion constituida sobre un error fundante-de-dolo. Ello exige clarificar la nocion misma de dolo, que resulta desacoplada de la nocion de conocimiento, asi como examinar el merito del asi llamado “argumento de la inversion”. El paso siguiente consiste en la impugnacion de la tradicional distincion entre las categorias de tentativa idonea y tentativa inidonea, para luego reconstruir detalladamente la distincion entre las categorias de tentativa y delito putativo, en referencia a los casos de causalidad putativa y los casos de error invertido acerca de un elemento normativo del tipo. El trabajo se cierra con un analisis del problema de la asi llamada “tentativa subjetivamente inidonea”, que lleva a su identificacion como una constelacion ulterior de delito putativo. EnglishThe paper explores some fundamental connections that exist between the doctrines of attempts and of means rea. The starting point is provided by the general characterization of the concept of attempt as an imputation structure built upon a dolus-grounding mistake. This imposes the need of both clarifying the very notion of dolus, which becomes disengaged from the notion of knowledge, and examining the merit of the so called “inversion argument”. The next step consists in a rejection of the traditional distinction between the categories of possible and impossible attempts, in order to carefully reconstruct the distinction between attempted and putative offenses, with reference to the cases of putative causation and of an inverted mistake concerning a normative element of the definition of an offense. The paper closes with an analysis of the problem of so called “subjectively impossible attempts”, that leads to their assessment as a constellation of putative offense.","PeriodicalId":38693,"journal":{"name":"Politica Criminal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Politica Criminal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-33992019000100296","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
espanolEl articulo explora algunas conexiones fundamentales que existen entre la dogmatica de la tentativa y la dogmatica del dolo. El punto de partida para ello se obtiene de la caracterizacion general de la tentativa de delito como una estructura de imputacion constituida sobre un error fundante-de-dolo. Ello exige clarificar la nocion misma de dolo, que resulta desacoplada de la nocion de conocimiento, asi como examinar el merito del asi llamado “argumento de la inversion”. El paso siguiente consiste en la impugnacion de la tradicional distincion entre las categorias de tentativa idonea y tentativa inidonea, para luego reconstruir detalladamente la distincion entre las categorias de tentativa y delito putativo, en referencia a los casos de causalidad putativa y los casos de error invertido acerca de un elemento normativo del tipo. El trabajo se cierra con un analisis del problema de la asi llamada “tentativa subjetivamente inidonea”, que lleva a su identificacion como una constelacion ulterior de delito putativo. EnglishThe paper explores some fundamental connections that exist between the doctrines of attempts and of means rea. The starting point is provided by the general characterization of the concept of attempt as an imputation structure built upon a dolus-grounding mistake. This imposes the need of both clarifying the very notion of dolus, which becomes disengaged from the notion of knowledge, and examining the merit of the so called “inversion argument”. The next step consists in a rejection of the traditional distinction between the categories of possible and impossible attempts, in order to carefully reconstruct the distinction between attempted and putative offenses, with reference to the cases of putative causation and of an inverted mistake concerning a normative element of the definition of an offense. The paper closes with an analysis of the problem of so called “subjectively impossible attempts”, that leads to their assessment as a constellation of putative offense.