{"title":"Impartiality through ‘Moral Optics’: Why Adam Smith revised David Hume's Moral Sentimentalism","authors":"Christine Fricke, M. Carrasco","doi":"10.3366/JSP.2021.0287","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We read Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as a critical response to David Hume's moral theory. While both share a commitment to moral sentimentalism, they propose different ways of meeting it...","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"1-18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3366/JSP.2021.0287","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We read Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as a critical response to David Hume's moral theory. While both share a commitment to moral sentimentalism, they propose different ways of meeting it...