Informal and Private: Bargaining and Veto Threats over the Freedom of Information Act

Abstract

Abstract The president’s formal role in lawmaking comes through the veto power, although Neustadt noted the informal power of persuasion through bargaining. Building from Azari and Smith’s work on information institutions, this research demonstrates how bargaining and veto threats function as an informal institution operating within the formal rules and constraints of the legislative development process, as there are no formal rules to govern presidential bargaining with Congress. The president’s power to persuade becomes contextual and situational to the issue, individual, and moment in time. Using the development of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the first amendment to the bill, I examine how and why presidents will choose to employ a private versus public bargaining strategy based on the context in which they find themselves. Using the same policy issue across three administrations – Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford - provides consistency in the political contexts allowing for an in-depth examination of a single policy issue. The informal nature of presidential engagement on legislation highlights the motivations and constraints presidents face in choosing a private or public strategy. Original archival research was conducted to provide the context-rich examination of the internal White House conversations along with the conversations between the president and Congress.