The doxastic profile of the compulsive re-checker

IF 0.9 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-08-19 DOI:10.1080/13869795.2022.2111454
Juliette Vazard
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

ABSTRACT Incessant checking is undeniably problematic from a practical point of view. But what is epistemically wrong with checking again (and again)? The starting assumption for this paper is that establishing what goes wrong when individuals check their stove ten times in a row requires understanding the nature of the doxastic attitude that compulsive re-checkers are in, as they go back to perform another check. Does the re-checker know that the stove is off, and is thus looking for more of what she already has (Whitcomb, D. 2010. “Curiosity was Framed.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3): 664–687.)? Or is she an inquirer who repeatedly loses her knowledge and finds herself inquiring again and again into the same question (Friedman, J. 2019. “Checking Again.” Philosophical Issues 29 (1): 84–96.)? I present what I see as the three main hypotheses currently available, and propose a refinement to Taylor's ‘what-if questioning’ account (2020).
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强迫性复查者的多嘴多舌
从实践的角度来看,不断的检查无疑是有问题的。但是一次又一次的检查在认识论上有什么错呢?本文的初始假设是,当一个人连续检查炉子十次时,要确定哪里出了问题,需要理解强迫性复核者在回去进行另一次检查时所持的对立态度的本质。复核员是否知道炉子已经关闭,因此正在寻找更多她已经拥有的东西(Whitcomb, D. 2010) ?“好奇心被陷害了。”哲学与现象学研究,81(3):664-687。或者她是一个不断失去知识的询问者,发现自己一次又一次地询问同一个问题(Friedman, J. 2019)。“检查一遍。”哲学问题29(1):84-96。我提出了我认为目前可用的三个主要假设,并对泰勒的“假设质疑”(2020)提出了改进。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
16.70%
发文量
29
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