Attributes and Implications of Mutual Fund Revenue Sharing and “Defensive” 12b-1 Fees

John A. Haslem
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Abstract

Revenue sharing rewards brokers for high and higher sales and/or asset holdings of fund shares, and further defrays current and higher broker costs of advertising and promotion, ongoing broker servicing of fund investor accounts, and educational support. It results in higher broker sales and increases fund assets under management (higher inflows) and profits; higher broker sales of fund shares increases sales concessions and distribution fees. Higher assets under management in turn increase trade size and broker commissions, trade execution, and profits. Revenue sharing usually brings direct payments from fund advisor “profits,” but may be bundled in fund management fees paid to advisors who write the checks. The use of management fees to pay revenue sharing increases fund fee size and fund outflows. Brokers rebate “fall-out benefits” from “excess” revenue sharing payments directly to fund advisors, which motivates higher revenue sharing payments and higher broker profits. Revenue sharing payments via management fees reduce current fund NAVs and shareholder returns. Most retail investors are unaware of the existence, nature, and costs of revenue sharing payments. Revenue sharing is agency conflicted with shareholder interests and returns. TOPICS: Mutual fund performance, wealth management
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共同基金收益分享和“防御性”12b-1费用的属性和含义
收益分成奖励经纪公司越来越高的销售额和/或持有基金股份的资产,并进一步支付当前和更高的经纪成本,如广告和促销、经纪公司为基金投资者账户提供的持续服务以及教育支持。这导致券商销售增加,基金管理资产(资金流入增加)和利润增加;券商对基金份额的销售增加,增加了销售优惠和分销费用。更高的管理资产反过来增加了交易规模和经纪人佣金、交易执行和利润。收益分成通常会带来基金顾问“利润”的直接支付,但可能会捆绑在基金管理费中,支付给写支票的顾问。使用管理费来支付收益分成增加了基金费用规模和资金流出。经纪公司将“超额”收入分成支付的“附带收益”直接返还给基金顾问,这激励了更高的收入分成支付和更高的经纪公司利润。通过管理费支付的收入分成降低了当前基金的资产净值和股东回报。大多数散户投资者不知道收入分成支付的存在、性质和成本。收入分享是与股东利益和回报相冲突的代理。主题:共同基金业绩、财富管理
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来源期刊
Journal of Wealth Management
Journal of Wealth Management Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics and Econometrics
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
32
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