Patent Assertion Entities and Patent Ownership Transparency: Strategic Recording of Patent Transactions at the Uspto

IF 1.3 4区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2021-07-17 DOI:10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB013
Valerio Sterzi
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

Many patent assertion entities (PAEs) hide behind multiple unknown subsidiaries or shell companies with obscure ownership. Meanwhile, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), like many other patent offices, does not impose a strict time period for recording the change of ownership of a patent, allowing the holder to gain an advantage by controlling the timing of its ownership disclosure. In this paper, we study to which extent PAEs delay the recording of the U.S. patent reassignments of patents that they will subsequently use in infringement patent lawsuits. On average, PAEs notify the change of ownership more quickly than producing firms, but this is not the case for the patents that they will litigate relatively far in time. In particular, the correlation between the recording lag of the patent transaction and the litigation spell is higher when the patent acquirer is a PAE (than when it is a producing firm) or when the acquirer will litigate the patent in the Eastern District of Texas, famously home to opportunistic litigations. Finally, we find that transactions involving unknown subsidiaries of PAEs are recorded at the USPTO significantly later than those involving PAE parent companies or their known subsidiaries.
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专利断言实体与专利所有权透明度:美国专利局专利交易的战略记录
许多专利主张实体(PAE)隐藏在多个不知名的子公司或所有权模糊的空壳公司后面。与此同时,与许多其他专利局一样,美国专利商标局(USPTO)没有对记录专利所有权的变化规定严格的时间段,允许持有人通过控制所有权披露的时间来获得优势。在本文中,我们研究了PAE在多大程度上延迟了他们随后将在侵权专利诉讼中使用的专利的美国专利重新分配的记录。平均而言,PAE比生产公司更快地通知所有权变更,但对于他们将在相对较远的时间内提起诉讼的专利来说,情况并非如此。特别是,当专利收购方是PAE时(比它是生产公司时),或者当收购方将在德克萨斯州东区对专利提起诉讼时,专利交易的记录滞后与诉讼期之间的相关性更高,德克萨斯州东区是机会主义诉讼的著名地。最后,我们发现,涉及PAE未知子公司的交易在USPTO的记录明显晚于涉及PAE母公司或其已知子公司的记录。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
26.70%
发文量
16
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