EQUITY PLEDGE, PLEDGOR TYPE AND INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY

K. Khaw, Jiaying Chen, M. Gulzar, A. Tajuddin
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Equity pledging is susceptible to agency problems and substantial risk, resulting in inefficient corporate investment. We show the negative impact is not just induced by controlling shareholders but also pledged by non-controlling shareholders and actual controllers. Our results add that SOEs with control rights via controlling shareholders or actual controllers can mitigate investment inefficiency problems. We conclude that pledgor type matters and the impact of non-controlling shareholders’ pledges should not be neglected.
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股权质押、出质人类型与投资效率
股权质押容易存在代理问题和重大风险,导致企业投资效率低下。我们发现,负面影响不仅由控股股东诱导,而且由非控股股东和实际控制人质押。我们的研究结果还表明,通过控股股东或实际控制人拥有控制权的国有企业可以缓解投资效率低下问题。我们认为,出质人类型和非控股股东质押的影响不容忽视。
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来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
审稿时长
20 weeks
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