What We Talk About When We Talk About US-Russia Strategic Stability

IF 0.5 Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament Pub Date : 2023-01-02 DOI:10.1080/25751654.2023.2221486
S. Bidgood
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Abstract

ABSTRACT Bilateral strategic stability between the United States and Russia is not a new concept, but it is one that is both evolving and contested. It faces two interrelated challenges that make its operationalization difficult today. First, as Michael Gerson has observed, it has “no single, universally accepted definition”, and there is little agreement on “which factors contribute to and detract from it”. Second, efforts to negotiate US-Russia bilateral arms control and risk reduction measures designed to advance strategic stability can become stymied as a result because negotiators lack a common goal. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine represents an inflection point for strategic stability on several levels. Against the backdrop of the impending expiration of New START and the arrival of what Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala call a third nuclear age, policymakers in Washington and Moscow should seek to reach a shared understanding of what strategic stability is and does as a means to its operationalization. Recognizing the challenges to doing so, particularly in the current environment, this article outlines two-phased approach to strategic stability dialogue that is informed by a philosophy of Pragmatism and translated into policy through mechanisms like backcasting and threatcasting. Its objective is to aid both sides in disambiguating their conceptualization of strategic stability while prioritizing approaches that can strengthen its most desirable outcomes.
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当我们谈论美俄战略稳定时,我们在谈论什么
摘要美国和俄罗斯之间的双边战略稳定并不是一个新概念,但它是一个既有演变又有争议的概念。它面临着两个相互关联的挑战,这使它今天难以运作。首先,正如Michael Gerson所观察到的,它“没有一个单一的、普遍接受的定义”,而且在“哪些因素有助于和有损于它”这一问题上几乎没有达成一致。其次,由于谈判人员缺乏共同目标,旨在促进战略稳定的美俄双边军备控制和风险降低措施的谈判可能会因此受阻。俄罗斯2022年入侵乌克兰在多个层面上代表着战略稳定的转折点。在《新削减战略武器条约》即将到期以及安德鲁·富特和本杰明·扎拉所称的第三个核时代即将到来的背景下,华盛顿和莫斯科的政策制定者应该寻求就战略稳定是什么以及战略稳定作为其运作手段的作用达成共识。认识到这样做的挑战,特别是在当前环境下,本文概述了战略稳定对话的两个阶段方法,该方法以实用主义哲学为基础,并通过回溯和威胁等机制转化为政策。其目标是帮助双方消除对战略稳定概念的歧义,同时优先考虑能够加强其最理想结果的方法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
36
审稿时长
12 weeks
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