Recognition and pathos

Abstract

Throughout this essay I offer an adumbrated critique of recognition theory through a psychoanalytic sensibility. Contemporary recognition theory relies on an overly optimistic and intellectualized view of social relations that fails to adequately consider pathological processes inherent in human motivation, particularly those that are unconsciously mediated by collective prejudice and dysrecognition. In revisiting the Hegelian struggle for recognition, much of social reality today is mired in a collective pathos that prevents optimal mutual recognition among social collectives. Not all people are disposed, let alone capable, of recognizing the Other. We may have to contend that, in the end, recognition means tolerance of difference and not merely acceptance of one other, which could still bring about a pragmatic co-existence even if people cannot recognize each other as equals. This is largely due, I suggest, to the ontology of prejudice, attachment deficits, and the failure to adopt empathy toward alterity.