The Controversy over Proxy Voting: The Role of Fund Managers and Proxy Advisors

IF 3.4 3区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Financial Analysts Journal Pub Date : 2023-08-30 DOI:10.1080/0015198X.2023.2240081
Arnoud Boot, J. Krahnen, Lemma W. Senbet, Chester Spatt
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In this statement, we assess the role and power of proxy advisors and asset managers in corporate governance in a market that is characterized by a limited number of voting advisory firms (Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis) and a growing dominance of index investing concentrated in a few large asset managers, such as BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street. We discuss the business model of proxy advisory firms and contrast its objectives with those of asset managers in the context of the informational screening/filtering role and voting analysis and conclude with a set of policy recommendations addressing transparency and regulatory oversight.
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代理投票争议:基金经理和代理顾问的角色
在本声明中,我们评估了代理顾问和资产管理公司在公司治理中的作用和权力,其市场特征是有限数量的投票咨询公司(Institutional Shareholder Services和Glass Lewis),以及指数投资日益集中在少数大型资产管理公司(如贝莱德、先锋和道富)的主导地位。我们讨论了代理咨询公司的商业模式,并在信息筛选/过滤角色和投票分析的背景下,将其目标与资产管理公司的目标进行了对比,最后提出了一套解决透明度和监管监督问题的政策建议。
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来源期刊
Financial Analysts Journal
Financial Analysts Journal BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
5.40
自引率
7.10%
发文量
31
期刊介绍: The Financial Analysts Journal aims to be the leading practitioner journal in the investment management community by advancing the knowledge and understanding of the practice of investment management through the publication of rigorous, peer-reviewed, practitioner-relevant research from leading academics and practitioners.
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