Reductive Evidentialism and the Normativity of Logic

IF 1.7 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-11-01 DOI:10.1017/can.2023.23
Nader Shoaibi
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Abstract

Abstract ‘Reductive Evidentialism’ seeks to explain away all ‘structural’ requirements of rationality—including norms of logical coherence—in terms of ‘substantive’ norms of rationality, i.e., responsiveness to evidence. While this view constitutes a novel take on the source of the normativity of logic, I argue that it faces serious difficulties. My argument, in a nutshell, is that on the assumption that individuals with the same evidence can have different rational responses (interpersonal permissivism), the view lacks the resources to maintain its central tenet that an individual’s body of evidence cannot make it rationally permissible for the individual to believe logical inconsistencies (intrapersonal nonpermissivism).
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还原证据主义与逻辑的规范性
“还原性证据主义”试图用理性的“实质性”规范,即对证据的反应性,来解释所有理性的“结构性”要求——包括逻辑一致性规范。虽然这种观点对逻辑规范性的来源构成了一种新颖的看法,但我认为它面临着严重的困难。简而言之,我的论点是,在假设拥有相同证据的个人可以有不同的理性反应(人际许可主义)的基础上,这种观点缺乏资源来维持其核心原则,即个人的证据不能使个人理性地允许相信逻辑不一致(人际非许可主义)。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
11.10%
发文量
16
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