Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’

IF 0.9 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-07-27 DOI:10.1080/13869795.2022.2093393
Anna Bortolan
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Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper investigates from a phenomenological perspective the origins of self-illness ambiguity. Drawing on phenomenological theories of affectivity and selfhood, I argue that, as a phenomenon which concerns primarily the ‘personal self’, self-illness ambiguity is dependent on distinct alterations of affective background orientations. I start by illustrating how personhood is anchored in the experience of a specific set of non-intentional affects – i.e. moods or existential feelings – alterations of which are often present in mental ill-health. Also through the exploration of the phenomenology of acute and long-term anxiety, I suggest that self-illness ambiguity originates in the presence of moods or existential feelings that are in tension with the ones that structure the person’s experience prior to the onset of the illness or when its symptoms are not experienced. More specifically, I claim that due to their ability to ‘block’ or ‘suspend’ some of the person’s affective and cognitive responses, such affective orientations may unsettle one’s self-defining evaluative perspective, leading to uncertainty and doubting about one’s personal self.
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Selves被劫持:“自我疾病模糊”中的情感和人格
摘要本文从现象学的角度探讨了自病歧义产生的根源。根据情感和自我的现象学理论,我认为,作为一种主要涉及“个人自我”的现象,自我疾病的模糊性取决于情感背景取向的不同变化。我首先阐述了人格是如何植根于一系列特定的非故意影响的体验中的,即情绪或存在感,这些影响的改变通常存在于精神疾病中。此外,通过对急性和长期焦虑现象学的探索,我认为,自我疾病的模糊性源于情绪或存在感的存在,这些情绪或存在感觉与在疾病发作前或没有经历症状时构建个人经历的情绪或存在感受相紧张。更具体地说,我声称,由于他们能够“阻断”或“暂停”一个人的一些情感和认知反应,这种情感取向可能会扰乱一个人自我定义的评价视角,导致对个人自我的不确定性和怀疑。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
16.70%
发文量
29
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