Self-Binding via Benchmarking: Collective Action, Desirable Futures, and NATO’s Two Percent Goal

Abstract

ABSTRACT How do states use benchmarks to organise their collective action? Although states increasingly rely on benchmarks to steer their collective action towards futures they deem desirable, research in IR has not yet unpacked the ways in which benchmarks alleviate – but also sometimes worsen – collective action problems. I argue that benchmarking enables states to tackle three interrelated problems: the coordination problem by the setting of common goals, the burden-sharing problem by the setting of individual goals and the assurance problem by generating comparative dynamics that are conducive to the fulfilment of these goals. Benchmarking thus amounts to a form of “self-binding” to certain futures. I illustrate and explore this self-binding through a case study of the two percent spending goal that NATO publicly adopted in 2014. The case study provides insights into how states back their commitment to goals through benchmarking while circumscribing the resulting pressure game to avert detrimental effects.