Bilateralism and Probabilism

IF 0.5 0 PHILOSOPHY Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI:10.36446/af.2022.387
Mariela Rubin
{"title":"Bilateralism and Probabilism","authors":"Mariela Rubin","doi":"10.36446/af.2022.387","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to provide a philosophical interpretation of bilateralism in terms of probabilism. In particular, to interpret the main concepts of bilateralism –acceptance, rejection and incoherence– in terms of the probabilistic notions of degree of belief and coherence. According to bilateralism, the meaning of logical connectives is determined by the acceptance and rejection conditions of the sentences in which they are involved, where acceptance and rejection cannot be reduced to one another. I will focus on a variant of bilateralism that understands logical consequence as the statement that it is incoherent to accept all the premises of a valid argument while rejecting all its conclusions. On the other hand, probabilism states that it is possible to interpret our degrees of belief in terms of probabilities. The aim of this work is then to interpret the concept of incoherence in terms of probability functions and determine when it is coherent to accept or to reject a proposition according to some threshold defined in terms of degrees of belief. To achieve this goal, we need both an interpretation of the concept of incoherence coined by the bilateralists as well as an interpretation of acceptance and rejection. I will show that a good interpretation of coherence in probabilistic terms can already be found in the literature. Then, I will give an interpretation of acceptance and rejection in terms of degrees of belief. In particular, I will show that it is possible to interpret these concepts in accordance with Locke’s thesis, the thesis that states that there is some threshold r such that if you believe some sentence in degree equal or higher than r you should accept it, without falling into epistemic paradoxes.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Analisis Filosofico","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.387","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to provide a philosophical interpretation of bilateralism in terms of probabilism. In particular, to interpret the main concepts of bilateralism –acceptance, rejection and incoherence– in terms of the probabilistic notions of degree of belief and coherence. According to bilateralism, the meaning of logical connectives is determined by the acceptance and rejection conditions of the sentences in which they are involved, where acceptance and rejection cannot be reduced to one another. I will focus on a variant of bilateralism that understands logical consequence as the statement that it is incoherent to accept all the premises of a valid argument while rejecting all its conclusions. On the other hand, probabilism states that it is possible to interpret our degrees of belief in terms of probabilities. The aim of this work is then to interpret the concept of incoherence in terms of probability functions and determine when it is coherent to accept or to reject a proposition according to some threshold defined in terms of degrees of belief. To achieve this goal, we need both an interpretation of the concept of incoherence coined by the bilateralists as well as an interpretation of acceptance and rejection. I will show that a good interpretation of coherence in probabilistic terms can already be found in the literature. Then, I will give an interpretation of acceptance and rejection in terms of degrees of belief. In particular, I will show that it is possible to interpret these concepts in accordance with Locke’s thesis, the thesis that states that there is some threshold r such that if you believe some sentence in degree equal or higher than r you should accept it, without falling into epistemic paradoxes.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
双边主义和概率主义
本文的目的是从概率论的角度对双边主义进行哲学解释。特别是,根据信念程度和一致性的概率概念来解释双边主义的主要概念——接受、拒绝和不一致。根据双边主义,逻辑连接词的含义是由它们所涉及的句子的接受和拒绝条件决定的,其中接受和拒绝不能相互减少。我将重点讨论双边主义的一个变体,它将逻辑后果理解为接受有效论点的所有前提而拒绝其所有结论是不连贯的。另一方面,概率论指出,用概率来解释我们的信仰程度是可能的。然后,这项工作的目的是从概率函数的角度解释不相干的概念,并根据根据置信度定义的一些阈值来确定何时接受或拒绝命题是相干的。为了实现这一目标,我们既需要对双边主义者提出的不连贯概念作出解释,也需要对接受和拒绝作出解释。我将证明,在文献中已经可以找到用概率术语对连贯性的良好解释。然后,我将从信仰的程度来解释接受和拒绝。特别是,我将表明,根据洛克的论文来解释这些概念是可能的,该论文指出,存在一些阈值r,如果你相信某个程度等于或高于r的句子,你应该接受它,而不会陷入认识悖论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
Analisis Filosofico
Analisis Filosofico PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
9
审稿时长
15 weeks
期刊介绍: Análisis Filosófico is an open access scientific journal issued by the Argentine Society of Philosophical Analysis (SADAF). Since 1981, it offers original and unpublished papers on theoretical and practical philosophy, discussions, critical studies and reviews –in Spanish, English and Portuguese– that contribute to the development of philosophical analysis. Essential conditions for publication are conceptual accuracy, precision and novelty. Its refereeing policy is based on double-blind reviews and external assessment. It is launched twice a year on May and November.
期刊最新文献
Pureza del método y práctica matemática: Desafíos y perspectivas Frege y sus circunstancias: Una interpretación de la teoría fregeana del significado Bromear como acto de habla y la relatividad lingüística del humor Fuerza, contenido y la metafísica del juicio La significancia de los casos idealizados de desacuerdo
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1