Terrain of Contestation: Complicating the Role of Aid in Border Diplomacy between Europe and Morocco

Abstract

Theorists of border externalization have portrayed aid in border control cooperation as a bargaining chip that the European Union uses to “buy” the cooperation of countries of “origin” and “transit.” More recent scholarship, instead, has depicted aid as a rent that Southern actors try to extract from Northern donors by capitalizing on the presence of foreign, “undesirable” populations within their own borders. Both explanations overlook the manifold ways countries of “origin” and “transit” maneuver aid in diplomatic relations over border control, thus failing to conceptualize aid beyond the incentive/rent binary. This paper analyses the implementation of three aid-funded projects in the field of migration in Morocco. Building on postcolonial international relations and organizational sociology, I argue that countries of “origin” and “transit” do not always welcome aid in the field of migration with open hands. Rather, they decide to cooperate (or not) with Global North donors and their subcontracting partners depending on how specific aid-funded projects fit into their broader domestic and international foreign policy strategy. I identify a three-tiered typology of engagement (facilitation, negotiation, and obstruction) to argue that aid rather works as a terrain where countries of “origin” and “transit” display, contest, and renegotiate diplomatic relations with Northern partners in situations of power asymmetry.