Risky rescues – a reply to Patrick Findler

Abstract

ABSTRACT In 2006, mountaineer David Sharp died on the slopes of Mount Everest. Sharp’s death led to public outrage after allegedly 40 climbers passed by the dying Sharp on their way to the peak, without stopping to help. But, since the slopes of Everest are a high-risk environment and rescuing Sharp would have entailed great risks for the rescuers, it is not clear whether the other mountaineers had a moral duty to rescue him. In a recent article, Patrick Findler introduces a principle to analyse such cases which states that we have a duty to rescue under dangerous circumstances, if the involved risks are not higher than the risks we are already taking in the pursuit of our own, morally less worthy ends. However, Findler then rejects this principle as too demanding. In this paper I will defend the principle against its inventor and argue in favour of such a duty. And while it may be true that the other mountaineers were justified in passing Sharp for different reasons, the principle shows that not only climbers, but adventure-sport athletes in general and people who engage in high-risk endeavours, may have a duty to rescue that doesn’t apply to others.