Do bond market participants care about directors’ and officers’ liability insurance?——Empirical evidence based on the pricing of corporate bonds

Q4 Business, Management and Accounting China Journal of Accounting Studies Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI:10.1080/21697213.2022.2143679
Yu Wang, Jiawei Lu, Xun Zhao
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Abstract

ABSTRACT Based on the risk hedging perspective, this paper examines the impact of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (hereafter referred to as D&O liability insurance) on the pricing of corporate bonds. We find that the purchase of D&O liability insurance can effectively reduce corporate bond insurance pricing. The path test shows that the purchase of D&O liability insurance can reduce the bond insurance pricing by improving the quality of company’s internal control. Furthermore, the paper finds that when management power is greater, investor protection is poor or financial risk is high,the impact of the D&O liability insurance is stronger. After purchasing D&O liability insurance, creditors will reduce the use of corporate governance contractual terms, but will set more investments and financing as well as option contractual terms. In addition, companies that purchase D&O liability insurance issue bonds with higher credit ratings and longer bond maturities.
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债券市场参与者关心董事和高管的责任保险吗----基于公司债券定价的经验证据
摘要基于风险对冲视角,本文考察了董事和高级管理人员责任保险(以下简称D&O责任保险)对公司债券定价的影响。我们发现,购买D&O责任险可以有效降低公司债券保险的定价。路径检验表明,购买D&O责任险可以通过提高公司内部控制质量来降低债券保险定价。此外,研究发现,当管理权越大、投资者保护越差或财务风险越高时,D&O责任保险的影响越大。在购买D&O责任保险后,债权人将减少公司治理合同条款的使用,但将设定更多的投资和融资以及期权合同条款。此外,购买D&O责任保险的公司发行信用评级更高、债券期限更长的债券。
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来源期刊
China Journal of Accounting Studies
China Journal of Accounting Studies Business, Management and Accounting-Business, Management and Accounting (all)
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
19
审稿时长
6 weeks
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