{"title":"Infrastructure, Revenue, and Services: Non-State Governance in Iraq’s Disputed Territories","authors":"Matthew F. Cancian, Diana B. Greenwald","doi":"10.1080/13698249.2022.2125718","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT While states and non-state armed groups often engage in militarised conflict over contested territory, at other times they co-govern in a tenuous equilibrium. Using a survey of over 1,600 Kurdish soldiers (Peshmerga) and elite interviews, we investigate local variation in shared governance in one such context – the disputed territories of northern Iraq. Despite the area being under Kurdish military control, the Iraqi government continued to provide services in districts where it had pre-existing infrastructural capacity. However, in revenue-producing districts, Kurdish actors appropriated infrastructural power to provide services themselves. This illustrates that non-state governance strategies, and their outputs, can vary locally.","PeriodicalId":51785,"journal":{"name":"Civil Wars","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Civil Wars","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2022.2125718","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
ABSTRACT While states and non-state armed groups often engage in militarised conflict over contested territory, at other times they co-govern in a tenuous equilibrium. Using a survey of over 1,600 Kurdish soldiers (Peshmerga) and elite interviews, we investigate local variation in shared governance in one such context – the disputed territories of northern Iraq. Despite the area being under Kurdish military control, the Iraqi government continued to provide services in districts where it had pre-existing infrastructural capacity. However, in revenue-producing districts, Kurdish actors appropriated infrastructural power to provide services themselves. This illustrates that non-state governance strategies, and their outputs, can vary locally.