{"title":"Why so serious? Lachaux and the threshold of ‘serious harm’ in section 1 Defamation Act 2013","authors":"Thomas D C Bennett","doi":"10.1080/17577632.2018.1446403","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd, the Court of Appeal held that s 1 Defamation Act 2013 was intended to “raise the bar” for defamation claims above the standard previously demanded at common law. However, despite finding that this was Parliament’s intention in enacting s 1, the Court held that this intention had not been successfully implemented by the wording of the Act. The notion that libel is a tort that is actionable per se is one that has a lengthy heritage at common law. However, an examination of case law between 2005 and 2013 reveals that libel had ceased to be actionable per se long before the new s 1 appeared on the statute books. The Court of Appeal thus based its ruling on a misunderstanding of the pre-Act common law position, resulting in a failure to interpret the Act in a manner consistent with the Parliamentary intention that the Court identified, thereby frustrating that very intention.","PeriodicalId":37779,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Media Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17577632.2018.1446403","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Media Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2018.1446403","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
ABSTRACT In Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd, the Court of Appeal held that s 1 Defamation Act 2013 was intended to “raise the bar” for defamation claims above the standard previously demanded at common law. However, despite finding that this was Parliament’s intention in enacting s 1, the Court held that this intention had not been successfully implemented by the wording of the Act. The notion that libel is a tort that is actionable per se is one that has a lengthy heritage at common law. However, an examination of case law between 2005 and 2013 reveals that libel had ceased to be actionable per se long before the new s 1 appeared on the statute books. The Court of Appeal thus based its ruling on a misunderstanding of the pre-Act common law position, resulting in a failure to interpret the Act in a manner consistent with the Parliamentary intention that the Court identified, thereby frustrating that very intention.
期刊介绍:
The only platform for focused, rigorous analysis of global developments in media law, this peer-reviewed journal, launched in Summer 2009, is: essential for teaching and research, essential for practice, essential for policy-making. It turns the spotlight on all those aspects of law which impinge on and shape modern media practices - from regulation and ownership, to libel law and constitutional aspects of broadcasting such as free speech and privacy, obscenity laws, copyright, piracy, and other aspects of IT law. The result is the first journal to take a serious view of law through the lens. The first issues feature articles on a wide range of topics such as: Developments in Defamation · Balancing Freedom of Expression and Privacy in the European Court of Human Rights · The Future of Public Television · Cameras in the Courtroom - Media Access to Classified Documents · Advertising Revenue v Editorial Independence · Gordon Ramsay: Obscenity Regulation Pioneer?