{"title":"Mind the Gap: Virtue Ethics and the Financial Crisis","authors":"Catherine Greene","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12089","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The financial crisis has led to calls for increased regulation of the financial sector. In many respects this is uncontroversial because increased regulation should promote the behaviours we want to see, while limiting the behaviours we do not. This article takes issue with the idea that regulation, and guidelines, promote ethical behaviour in the way that we want them to. Firstly, judgement is often required to implement guidelines and regulations, which allows room for unethical behaviour. Secondly, we want financial professionals to behave ethically even when there are significant incentives not to; so, verifying compliance with regulations and guidelines when such incentives are absent isn’t a good gauge of the ethical status of financial professionals. \nThe example of the valuation of the assets (Net Asset Value) of hedge funds illustrates these issues well. There are many rules governing how NAVs should be calculated, and while we can verify that a fund is abiding by the rules, the ability to manipulate the NAV remains. Furthermore, the incentive to do so is often only present during a crisis (usually to understate losses). Therefore, verifying compliance during ‘normal’ times is of little help in judging whether a manager will behave ethically when we most need him to. I first argue that the gap between compliance with regulations and ethical behaviour is best filled by the adoption of a virtue ethics approach, as discussed by Spalding & Oddo (2011), and Graafland & van de Ven (2011). I then discuss the implications of adopting such an approach for the financial industry’s codes of conduct, such as the CFA Institute’s ‘Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct’ (www.cfainstitute.org). Adopting a virtue ethics perspective would require a significant change in the emphasis of such codes.","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2018-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12089","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12089","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
The financial crisis has led to calls for increased regulation of the financial sector. In many respects this is uncontroversial because increased regulation should promote the behaviours we want to see, while limiting the behaviours we do not. This article takes issue with the idea that regulation, and guidelines, promote ethical behaviour in the way that we want them to. Firstly, judgement is often required to implement guidelines and regulations, which allows room for unethical behaviour. Secondly, we want financial professionals to behave ethically even when there are significant incentives not to; so, verifying compliance with regulations and guidelines when such incentives are absent isn’t a good gauge of the ethical status of financial professionals.
The example of the valuation of the assets (Net Asset Value) of hedge funds illustrates these issues well. There are many rules governing how NAVs should be calculated, and while we can verify that a fund is abiding by the rules, the ability to manipulate the NAV remains. Furthermore, the incentive to do so is often only present during a crisis (usually to understate losses). Therefore, verifying compliance during ‘normal’ times is of little help in judging whether a manager will behave ethically when we most need him to. I first argue that the gap between compliance with regulations and ethical behaviour is best filled by the adoption of a virtue ethics approach, as discussed by Spalding & Oddo (2011), and Graafland & van de Ven (2011). I then discuss the implications of adopting such an approach for the financial industry’s codes of conduct, such as the CFA Institute’s ‘Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct’ (www.cfainstitute.org). Adopting a virtue ethics perspective would require a significant change in the emphasis of such codes.
金融危机促使人们呼吁加强对金融部门的监管。在许多方面,这是没有争议的,因为加强监管应该促进我们想看到的行为,同时限制我们不想看到的行动。这篇文章对监管和指导方针以我们希望的方式促进道德行为的观点提出了异议。首先,执行指导方针和条例往往需要判断,这为不道德行为留出了空间。其次,我们希望金融专业人士的行为合乎道德,即使有很大的动机不这样做;因此,在缺乏此类激励措施的情况下,核实是否遵守了法规和指导方针,并不能很好地衡量金融专业人士的道德状况。对冲基金资产估值(资产净值)的例子很好地说明了这些问题。有许多规则规定了如何计算NAV,虽然我们可以验证基金是否遵守了这些规则,但操纵NAV的能力仍然存在。此外,这样做的动机往往只在危机期间存在(通常是为了低估损失)。因此,在“正常”时期核实合规性对判断经理在我们最需要的时候是否会有道德行为几乎没有帮助。我首先认为,正如Spalding&Oddo(2011)和Graafland&van de Ven(2011)所讨论的那样,遵守法规和道德行为之间的差距最好通过采用美德道德方法来填补。然后,我讨论了采用这种方法对金融业行为准则的影响,例如CFA研究所的“道德准则和职业行为标准”(www.cfainstitute.org)。采用道德伦理观点需要对这些准则的重点进行重大改变。
期刊介绍:
Midwest Studies in Philosophy presents important thinking on a single topic in philosophy with each volume. Influential contributors bring provocative and varying ideas to the theme at hand. Recent volumes of Midwest Studies in Philosophy include Truth and its Deformities, Philosophy and the Empirical, Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility, and Free Will and Moral Responsibility.