Chen Lin , Randall Morck , Bernard Yeung , Xiaofeng Zhao
{"title":"What do we learn from stock price reactions to China's first announcement of anti-corruption reforms?","authors":"Chen Lin , Randall Morck , Bernard Yeung , Xiaofeng Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.jfds.2023.100096","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>China's markets gained 3.86% around December 4, 2012, when the Party announced anti-corruption reforms. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) with higher past entertainment and travel costs (<em>ETC</em>) gained more. NonSOEs gained in more liberalized provinces, especially those with high past <em>ETC</em>, productivity, growth opportunities, and external financing. NonSOEs lost in the least liberalized provinces, especially those with high past <em>ETC</em>. These findings support investors' expect reduced official corruption to create value overall, reduce SOE waste, lower bureaucratic barriers to efficient resource allocation where markets function, and impede business in unliberalized provinces, where “getting things done” still requires investment in greasing bureaucratic gears.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":36340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance and Data Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Finance and Data Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405918823000120","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Mathematics","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
China's markets gained 3.86% around December 4, 2012, when the Party announced anti-corruption reforms. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) with higher past entertainment and travel costs (ETC) gained more. NonSOEs gained in more liberalized provinces, especially those with high past ETC, productivity, growth opportunities, and external financing. NonSOEs lost in the least liberalized provinces, especially those with high past ETC. These findings support investors' expect reduced official corruption to create value overall, reduce SOE waste, lower bureaucratic barriers to efficient resource allocation where markets function, and impede business in unliberalized provinces, where “getting things done” still requires investment in greasing bureaucratic gears.