Disclosure strategies for management earnings forecasts: The role of managerial compensation structures, overoptimism, and effort

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100351
Hao-Chang Sung , Shirley J. Ho
{"title":"Disclosure strategies for management earnings forecasts: The role of managerial compensation structures, overoptimism, and effort","authors":"Hao-Chang Sung ,&nbsp;Shirley J. Ho","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100351","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Management earnings forecasts have received significant attention as an important source for setting firm expectations. Our paper argues that how these forecasts are presented to the public is important for managing these expectations. We present both analytical and empirical analyses demonstrating that managers’ disclosure framing choices will depend on the information type, managerial overoptimism, and managerial compensation structures. We also provide evidence showing that disclosure framing choices can dampen stock return volatility. Finally, we indicate that disclosure strategies alter the misreporting results found in Guttman et al. (2006).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"Article 100351"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566923000012","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

Management earnings forecasts have received significant attention as an important source for setting firm expectations. Our paper argues that how these forecasts are presented to the public is important for managing these expectations. We present both analytical and empirical analyses demonstrating that managers’ disclosure framing choices will depend on the information type, managerial overoptimism, and managerial compensation structures. We also provide evidence showing that disclosure framing choices can dampen stock return volatility. Finally, we indicate that disclosure strategies alter the misreporting results found in Guttman et al. (2006).

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
管理层盈余预测的披露策略:管理层薪酬结构、过度乐观和努力的作用
作为设定公司预期的重要来源,管理层盈利预测受到了极大的关注。我们的论文认为,如何向公众展示这些预测对于管理这些预期很重要。本文的分析和实证分析均表明,管理者的披露框架选择将取决于信息类型、管理层过度乐观和管理层薪酬结构。我们还提供证据表明,披露框架的选择可以抑制股票收益波动。最后,我们指出披露策略改变了Guttman等人(2006)发现的误报结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
期刊最新文献
Editorial Board Expanded auditor’s reports and voluntary disclosure Long-term tax strategy and corporate acquisition payment structure: An analysis based on the book-tax tradeoff theory Dividend signalling and investor protection: An international comparison MD&A tone and stock returns
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1