Designing division of labor with strategic uncertainty within organizations: Model analysis and a behavioral experiment

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-10-10 DOI:10.1111/jems.12506
Yoshio Kamijo, Daisuke Nakama
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Abstract

For managers who are responsible for designing the division of labor, there are prototypes such as the divisional and functional designs, but insufficient knowledge of what to consider when selecting them. To address this shortfall, we developed a multiple economic game model with a two-step structure to examine the strategic interdependence between the two prototypes. We analyzed the model from three different perspectives: a traditional analysis, an equilibrium analysis, and a behavioral analysis followed by a laboratory experiment. While the first analysis revealed that the functional design would outperform divisional design when individual decisions are exogenous, the game theoretic equilibrium analysis demonstrated that the two prototype designs have similar equilibria when individuals are rational. However, assuming that individuals made autonomous decisions with accessible information under given organizational structures, behavioral analysis derived predictions that the divisional design was more likely to produce favorable consequences than the functional design. This prediction was confirmed by the economic experiment in the laboratory. These results imply that the strategic uncertainty within organizations differs according to the designs and affects organizational consequences.

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组织内部具有战略不确定性的分工设计:模型分析和行为实验
对于负责设计分工的管理者来说,有分工和功能设计等原型,但不知道在选择时应该考虑什么。为了解决这一不足,我们开发了一个具有两步结构的多重经济博弈模型,以检验两个原型之间的战略相互依赖性。我们从三个不同的角度分析了该模型:传统分析、平衡分析和行为分析,然后进行实验室实验。虽然第一个分析表明,当个体决策是外生的时,功能设计会优于分部设计,但博弈论均衡分析表明,两个原型设计在个体理性时具有相似的均衡。然而,假设个人在给定的组织结构下利用可访问的信息做出自主决策,行为分析得出的预测是,部门设计比功能设计更有可能产生有利的结果。实验室的经济实验证实了这一预测。这些结果表明,组织内部的战略不确定性因设计而异,并影响组织后果。
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CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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