Tying in two-sided markets with heterogeneous advertising revenues and negative pricing

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-06-20 DOI:10.1111/jems.12547
Jong-Hee Hahn, Sang-Hyun Kim, So Hye Yoon
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

We offer a theory of anticompetitive tying in two-sided markets when below-cost or negative pricing is possible. With the coexistence of two consumer groups (one regarding tying and tied goods as complementary and the other as independent), a tying-good monopolist may face difficulties in extracting rent under separate sales and wish to use tying to directly capture the large advertising revenue created in the complementary segment. We uncover two distinct mechanisms by which tying raises monopoly profits but reduces social welfare. Our theory of tying can be applied to real-world antitrust law enforcement, such as the Google Android case.

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在具有异质广告收入和负定价的双边市场中捆绑
当低于成本或负定价是可能的时,我们提供了双边市场中的反竞争搭售理论。在两个消费者群体共存的情况下(一个认为搭售和捆绑商品是互补的,另一个认为是独立的),搭售好的垄断者可能在单独销售的情况下难以提取租金,并希望利用搭售直接获取互补细分市场中创造的大量广告收入。我们发现了两种不同的机制,搭售提高了垄断利润,但降低了社会福利。我们的搭售理论可以应用于现实世界的反垄断执法,例如谷歌安卓案件。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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