China's Diplomatic Leverage on North Korean Provocations: Effect of High-Level Meetings Between China and North Korea on North Korean Missile and Nuclear Tests

Abstract

Nuclear and missile tests by North Korea, which directly threaten China's national interests, regional stability, and economic development, have consistently irritated China. Since the 1950s, China and North Korea have held high-level meetings aimed at discussing and improving their bilateral relationship. Using empirical analysis, this study attempts to examine the impact of these meetings on North Korea's missile and nuclear tests. The study argues that as the frequency of high-level meetings between China and North Korea increases, North Korea's provocative actions decrease. The high-level meetings serve to address the issue of incomplete information, create avenues for economic aid and cooperation, and reduce the likelihood of future nuclear and missile tests. The empirical findings indicate that while high-level meetings with or without the presence of top leaders can lead to a reduction in missile tests by North Korea, only summits between China and North Korea have a significant impact on the reduction of nuclear tests by North Korea.