Looking beyond the constituent power theory: The theory of equitable elite bargaining

IF 0.8 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Global Constitutionalism Pub Date : 2023-06-16 DOI:10.1017/s2045381723000096
Amal Sethi
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The constituent power theory, which served critical functions for several years, has outlived its utility as the preeminent yardstick to measure the normative legitimacy of a constitution. As the theory stands, it cannot apply on its own terms to most instances of modern constitution-making. At the same time, it is highly susceptible to being used to legitimize authoritarian outcomes. The scholarly literature that attempts to reimagine or expand the theory is scant and unable to overcome its problems. In response, this article develops an alternative standard: the theory of equitable elite bargaining. This theory provides that a constitution is normatively legitimate if it is the product of an equitable bargain between elites from most major political groups in society at the moment of constitution-making. The theory of equitable elite bargaining is applicable to the realities of modern constitution-making and makes it more difficult to legitimize authoritarian constitutions. Further, both representation-based and consequentialist arguments can justify a constitution drafted in accordance with the theory as normatively legitimate. The theory imposes a standard that can result in arduous constitution-making processes and moderated constitutional content. Additionally, its focus on elites poses challenging questions. However, this article will argue that the net benefits of this theory warrant its consideration as a new standard to assess normative constitutional legitimacy.
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超越构成权力理论:公平精英议价理论
立宪权力理论在过去几年中发挥了重要作用,但作为衡量宪法规范性合法性的卓越标准,它已经失去了效用。按照该理论的立场,它不能以自己的方式适用于大多数现代制宪实例。与此同时,它很容易被用来使专制结果合法化。试图重新想象或扩展这一理论的学术文献很少,也无法克服它的问题。对此,本文提出了另一种标准:公平精英议价理论。这一理论认为,如果一部宪法是社会上大多数主要政治团体的精英在制宪时公平交易的产物,那么它在规范上是合法的。公平精英议价理论适用于现代制宪现实,使专制宪法难以合法化。此外,基于代表性和结果主义的论点都可以证明根据该理论起草的宪法在规范上是合法的。该理论强加了一种标准,可能导致艰巨的制宪过程和节制的宪法内容。此外,它对精英的关注带来了具有挑战性的问题。然而,本文将认为,这一理论的净收益值得将其作为评估规范性宪法合法性的新标准。
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来源期刊
Global Constitutionalism
Global Constitutionalism Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
28
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