{"title":"Pin-ups and Journalists: A Model of Media Market with News and Entertainment","authors":"M. Battaggion, A. Vaglio","doi":"10.1080/08997764.2015.1094078","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this article, the authors model a market for news where two sources compete for the audience. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their tastes for the news and entertainment. The authors model endogenously the sources' choices concerning the news accuracy and the level of entertainment, together with the audience's behavior, which includes reading one or two sources as well as not reading at all. The authors provide a rigorous setting explaining why individuals get informed according to a Bayesian behavior. Then, when some individuals read more than one source, they show that the competition is relaxed and the incentives to invest in quality lacks. In this respect, pluralism, defined as the possibility to jointly resort to more than one paper, does not automatically guarantee a higher press quality.","PeriodicalId":29945,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF MEDIA ECONOMICS","volume":"28 1","pages":"217 - 245"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2015-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08997764.2015.1094078","citationCount":"6","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF MEDIA ECONOMICS","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997764.2015.1094078","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMMUNICATION","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Abstract
In this article, the authors model a market for news where two sources compete for the audience. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their tastes for the news and entertainment. The authors model endogenously the sources' choices concerning the news accuracy and the level of entertainment, together with the audience's behavior, which includes reading one or two sources as well as not reading at all. The authors provide a rigorous setting explaining why individuals get informed according to a Bayesian behavior. Then, when some individuals read more than one source, they show that the competition is relaxed and the incentives to invest in quality lacks. In this respect, pluralism, defined as the possibility to jointly resort to more than one paper, does not automatically guarantee a higher press quality.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Media Economics publishes original research on the economics and policy of mediated communication, focusing on firms, markets, and institutions. Reflecting the increasing diversity of analytical approaches employed in economics and recognizing that policies promoting social and political objectives may have significant economic impacts on media, the Journal encourages submissions reflecting the insights of diverse disciplinary perspectives and research methodologies, both empirical and theoretical.
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