A Case Study of Regulating Helicopter Safety in the Canadian Offshore Oil Industry: The Crash of Cougar Flight 491

Abstract

Abstract The paper assesses the effectiveness of the Canadian offshore oil safety regulatory regime leading up to a helicopter crash in 2009 with 17 fatalities, and in the context of international concern about offshore helicopter safety, a previous Canadian offshore disaster and international debates on the impact of the continuing shift towards goal setting in a deregulatory environment. The study was informed by assessment criteria synthesised from the literature, namely the evaluation of institutional design (the likelihood of independence) and regulatory process (gathering information on risk, setting standards, enforcement, participation and transparency). Qualitative analysis of documentary data generated from provincial and national investigations — including verbatim transcripts of inquiry evidence provided by industry, labour and government, plus regulatory and media sources — was used to assess the role of the regulators involved. The paper concludes that the regulatory framework had been largely ineffective leading up to the crash. The institutional design of the offshore regulator, which had dual responsibility for resource development and safety, was concluded as problematic and likely to have been connected to failures regarding all the regulatory process criteria. The federal regulator, responsible for Canadian aviation safety, was also seen as ineffective. In particular, safety standards were low in the operators’ contracts with the helicopter company, featuring many regulatory gaps, with missing or inadequate emergency technology in the helicopter itself, personal survival equipment, and search and rescue. Subsequent improvements in regulatory process are seen as limited by the low likelihood of important structural reform and the closure of vital regulatory gaps, given current government deregulatory policies.