Winners, Losers, and Efficiency: Achieving Multiple Goals in Japan's Financial System Reforms

IF 3.9 3区 管理学 Q1 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis Pub Date : 2000-04-01 DOI:10.1080/13876980008412634
C. Weare, E. Smolensky
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

When giving policy advice, economists often proceed as if efficiency is the only valid social goal. Although efficiency is important, we argue that single-minded pursuit of it is counterproductive. It unnecessarily erects political hurdles to the enactment of efficiency-enhancing reforms because policy proposals that ignore valid, nonefficiency concerns are more likely to meet political and bureaucratic resistance. Moreover, such resistance may be avoided. A number of design principals can be employed to craft proposals that address political goals without abandoning efficiency. We describe three classes of principles: creative design of market mechanisms, maintenance of marginal incentives, and compensation for losers.We then illustrate their practical application in the context of Japanese financial-sector deregulation. This policy area usefully illustrates the importance of considering multiple goals in policy design. While efficiency is a frequently expressed goal, Japan's continued policy paralysis indicates that the bureaucratic and political goals of major stakeholders make the straightforward deregulation of financial markets difficult to achieve. We do not purport to resolve the entrenched barriers to economic reform in Japan, but to the extent that we identify and address valid nonefficiency goals, the conclusions of the analysis are relevant.
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赢家、输家和效率:实现日本金融体制改革的多重目标
在给出政策建议时,经济学家常常把效率当作唯一有效的社会目标。虽然效率很重要,但我们认为一味追求效率只会适得其反。它不必要地为制定提高效率的改革设置了政治障碍,因为忽视有效、无效率问题的政策建议更有可能遇到政治和官僚主义的阻力。此外,这种阻力是可以避免的。在不放弃效率的情况下,可以采用许多设计原则来起草解决政治目标的提案。我们描述了三类原则:市场机制的创造性设计、边际激励的维持和对输家的补偿。然后,我们说明了它们在日本金融部门放松管制背景下的实际应用。这个政策领域有效地说明了在政策设计中考虑多个目标的重要性。虽然效率是一个经常被提及的目标,但日本持续的政策瘫痪表明,主要利益相关者的官僚主义和政治目标,使得对金融市场的直接放松管制难以实现。我们并不打算解决日本经济改革中根深蒂固的障碍,但就我们确定和解决有效的非效率目标而言,分析的结论是相关的。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.90
自引率
6.10%
发文量
22
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