Contingent Fees with Legal Discovery

IF 1 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2016-04-01 DOI:10.1093/ALER/AHV020
F. Baumann, Tim Friehe
{"title":"Contingent Fees with Legal Discovery","authors":"F. Baumann, Tim Friehe","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHV020","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship between a plaintiff and her lawyer when the lawyer chooses the settlement offer and undertakes legal discovery. Our objective was to highlight the implications of discovery for the contingent-fee arrangement that is optimal for the plaintiff. We consider bifurcated contingent fees and show that the consideration of legal discovery attenuates the standard asymmetry between the contingent fee for a settlement and the contingent fee for a judgment. To obtain the maximal joint surplus of the plaintiff–lawyer pair, the arrangement must specify nonlinear contingent fees.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"18 1","pages":"155-175"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHV020","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Law and Economics Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHV020","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7

Abstract

This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship between a plaintiff and her lawyer when the lawyer chooses the settlement offer and undertakes legal discovery. Our objective was to highlight the implications of discovery for the contingent-fee arrangement that is optimal for the plaintiff. We consider bifurcated contingent fees and show that the consideration of legal discovery attenuates the standard asymmetry between the contingent fee for a settlement and the contingent fee for a judgment. To obtain the maximal joint surplus of the plaintiff–lawyer pair, the arrangement must specify nonlinear contingent fees.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
附带法律发现的或有费用
本文分析了律师在选择和解条件和进行法律发现时,原告与其律师之间的委托代理关系。我们的目的是强调证据开示对原告最有利的或有费安排的影响。我们考虑了分岔的或有费,并表明法律发现的考虑削弱了和解或有费和判决或有费之间的标准不对称。为了获得原告-律师对的最大共同剩余,该安排必须规定非线性或有费用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
9
期刊介绍: The rise of the field of law and economics has been extremely rapid over the last 25 years. Among important developments of the 1990s has been the founding of the American Law and Economics Association. The creation and rapid expansion of the ALEA and the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada attest to the growing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policy-makers.
期刊最新文献
Biased Mediators in Conflict Resolution Present Bias and Debt-Financed Durable Goods Continuances and Uncertainty in the Course of Adjudication More Talk, Less Conflict: Evidence from Requiring Informal Discovery Conferences Does the Fundamental Transformation Deter Trade? An Experiment
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1