Eugenia Y. Lee, Jong-Hag Choi, Eunhee Kim, Hee-Yeon Sunwoo
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
Despite regulators' on-going concerns on the high concentration of the current audit market, the effects of concentration on auditors' behavior is still debated. We provide an answer to this unresolved issue by considering the role of legal regime in shaping auditors' pricing strategy in a concentrated market. Using data from 33 countries, we find no significant association between audit market concentration and audit fees in the pooled international sample. However, a country's legal regime changes this association dramatically: the association is significantly positive in countries with a weak legal regime but becomes weaker and eventually turns negative as countries' legal regime becomes stronger. Our study highlights the importance of country-level institutions in determining how market structure affects market participants' behavior.
期刊介绍：
In addition to communicating the results of original auditing research, the International Journal of Auditing also aims to advance knowledge in auditing by publishing critiques, thought leadership papers and literature reviews on specific aspects of auditing. The journal seeks to publish articles that have international appeal either due to the topic transcending national frontiers or due to the clear potential for readers to apply the results or ideas in their local environments. While articles must be methodologically and theoretically sound, any research orientation is acceptable. This means that papers may have an analytical and statistical, behavioural, economic and financial (including agency), sociological, critical, or historical basis. The editors consider articles for publication which fit into one or more of the following subject categories: • Financial statement audits • Public sector/governmental auditing • Internal auditing • Audit education and methods of teaching auditing (including case studies) • Audit aspects of corporate governance, including audit committees • Audit quality • Audit fees and related issues • Environmental, social and sustainability audits • Audit related ethical issues • Audit regulation • Independence issues • Legal liability and other legal issues • Auditing history • New and emerging audit and assurance issues
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