Thinking about Progress: From Science to Philosophy

IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY NOUS Pub Date : 2021-06-29 DOI:10.1111/nous.12383
Finnur Dellsén, Insa Lawler, James Norton
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

Is there progress in philosophy? If so, how much? Philosophers have recently argued for a wide range of answers to these questions, from the view that there is no progress whatsoever to the view that philosophy has provided answers to all the big philosophical questions. However, these views are difficult to compare and evaluate, because they rest on very different assumptions about the conditions under which philosophy would make progress. This paper looks to the comparatively mature debate about scientific progress for inspiration on how to formulate four distinct accounts of philosophical progress, in terms of truthlikeness, problem-solving, knowledge, and understanding. Equally importantly, the paper outlines a common framework for how to understand and evaluate these accounts. We distill a series of lessons from this exercise, to help pave the way for a more fruitful discussion about philosophical progress in the future.
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思考进步:从科学到哲学
哲学有进步吗?如果有,多少钱?哲学家们最近为这些问题提出了各种各样的答案,从认为没有任何进步的观点到认为哲学已经为所有重大的哲学问题提供了答案的观点。然而,这些观点很难比较和评价,因为它们基于对哲学取得进步的条件的非常不同的假设。本文着眼于关于科学进步的相对成熟的辩论,以寻求如何在真理、问题解决、知识和理解方面形成哲学进步的四种不同描述的灵感。同样重要的是,本文概述了如何理解和评估这些账户的通用框架。我们从这一实践中提炼出一系列的经验教训,以帮助为未来关于哲学进步的更富有成效的讨论铺平道路。
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来源期刊
NOUS
NOUS PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
5.10
自引率
4.80%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: Noûs, a premier philosophy journal, publishes articles that address the whole range of topics at the center of philosophical debate, as well as long critical studies of important books. Subscribers to Noûs also receive two prestigious annual publications at no additional cost: Philosophical Issues and Philosophical Perspectives.
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