A comparative analysis of the right of a pregnant woman to refuse medical treatment for herself and her viable fetus: the United States and United Kingdom.
{"title":"A comparative analysis of the right of a pregnant woman to refuse medical treatment for herself and her viable fetus: the United States and United Kingdom.","authors":"B. Glass","doi":"10.18060/17727","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Few legal topics have raised more debate than the right of a pregnant woman to refuse medical treatment for religious, moral, philosophical, or personal reasons.' A woman's decision raises common law, statutory, constitutional, and ethical questions. Courts must define the scope of a pregnant woman's right to privacy in her own bodily integrity and compare that right to the State's interest in protecting the health of the viable fetus. 2 Courts in the United States and United Kingdom have adopted the general rule that a pregnant woman may refuse medical treatment; however, each system provides different exceptions to the general rule.3 This Note has two purposes. First, this Note will explain the development of a pregnant woman's right to refuse medical treatment in both the United States and the United Kingdom,4 and second, this Note will explore the situations where each system allows courts to intervene and force treatment. While the judicial system of the United Kingdom allows a court to override a woman's choice in certain circumstances, a majority of courts in the United States have not used this approach. This Note will explain the source of the right to refuse treatment in the United States and United Kingdom and then compare and contrast the exceptions to the general rule in an attempt to formulate the best approach to these precarious moral and legal dilemmas.","PeriodicalId":83742,"journal":{"name":"Indiana international & comparative law review","volume":"11 2 1","pages":"507-41"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2001-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Indiana international & comparative law review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.18060/17727","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
Few legal topics have raised more debate than the right of a pregnant woman to refuse medical treatment for religious, moral, philosophical, or personal reasons.' A woman's decision raises common law, statutory, constitutional, and ethical questions. Courts must define the scope of a pregnant woman's right to privacy in her own bodily integrity and compare that right to the State's interest in protecting the health of the viable fetus. 2 Courts in the United States and United Kingdom have adopted the general rule that a pregnant woman may refuse medical treatment; however, each system provides different exceptions to the general rule.3 This Note has two purposes. First, this Note will explain the development of a pregnant woman's right to refuse medical treatment in both the United States and the United Kingdom,4 and second, this Note will explore the situations where each system allows courts to intervene and force treatment. While the judicial system of the United Kingdom allows a court to override a woman's choice in certain circumstances, a majority of courts in the United States have not used this approach. This Note will explain the source of the right to refuse treatment in the United States and United Kingdom and then compare and contrast the exceptions to the general rule in an attempt to formulate the best approach to these precarious moral and legal dilemmas.