The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law

J. Glover
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引用次数: 31

Abstract

The American regulatory system is unique in that it expressly relies upon a diffuse set of regulators, including private parties, rather than upon a centralized bureaucracy, for the effectuation of its substantive aims. In contrast with more traditional conceptions of private enforcement as an ad hoc supplement to public law, this Article argues that private regulation through litigation is an integral part of the structure of the modern regulatory state. Private litigation and the mechanisms that enable it are not merely add-ons to our regulatory regime, much less are they fundamentally at odds with it. Yet mechanisms of enforcement attendant to private suits are being restricted in numerous ways, and on numerous fronts, in the form of prohibitions on the use of the class action device, the recalibration of procedural mechanisms through private contract to discourage suit, the heightening of pleading standards, and the pre-emption of state law causes of action, just to name a few. Although these restrictions in some instances may provide necessary correctives to the system of private litigation in particular and the functioning of overall regulatory schemes more generally, in their broad-sweeping forms, they threaten to undermine systematically substantive regulatory law. Yet the larger regulatory consequences of these efforts receive inadequate attention.This Article thus offers a more systemic view of these mechanisms of private enforcement by providing elements of a conceptual framework for tailoring mechanisms of private litigation to the contours of particular regulatory regimes. This framework seeks to effectuate and extend the systemic interests in aligning private mechanisms with the regulatory goals of particular areas of substantive law, and at the same time seeks to balance the value of such mechanisms with concerns that they will, in some substantive regimes, generate undesired regulatory consequences. Indeed, this framework highlights the need, in some instances, for limitations on the use of private enforcement mechanisms, as well as the need, in other circumstances, for the creation of new mechanisms that are more carefully calibrated to address potential pathologies. This framework is therefore preferable to one-size-fits-all, abstract approaches to a number of seemingly disparate debates regarding restrictions on private enforcement mechanisms across our legal landscape. By offering a systemic view of various debates about these mechanisms, this framework offers the hope of eventual resolution of these seemingly intractable disputes. This framework also seeks to provide guidance to judges, agencies, and legislatures in the task of tailoring mechanisms of private enforcement to the achievement of public regulatory objectives.
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私法执行机制在公法中的结构性作用
美国监管体系的独特之处在于,它明确地依赖于一组分散的监管机构,包括私人团体,而不是一个集中的官僚机构,以实现其实质性目标。与将私人执行作为公法的特别补充的传统观念相反,本文认为通过诉讼进行的私人监管是现代监管国家结构的一个组成部分。私人诉讼和促成诉讼的机制不仅仅是我们监管制度的附加,更不用说从根本上与之相悖了。然而,私人诉讼的执行机制在许多方面受到限制,在许多方面,以禁止使用集体诉讼手段的形式,通过私人合同重新调整程序机制以阻止诉讼,提高辩护标准,以及优先考虑州法诉讼原因,仅举几例。虽然这些限制在某些情况下可能特别对私人诉讼制度和更普遍的全面管制计划的运作提供必要的纠正,但它们以广泛的形式有可能有步骤地破坏实质性管制法。然而,这些努力带来的更大的监管后果却没有得到足够的重视。因此,本文通过提供一个概念框架的要素,以使私人诉讼机制适应特定监管制度的轮廓,对这些私人执法机制提供了一个更系统的观点。这一框架力求实现和扩大使私人机制与实体法特定领域的监管目标保持一致的系统利益,同时力求平衡这种机制的价值与它们在某些实体法制度中可能产生不希望的监管后果的担忧。的确,这一框架突出表明,在某些情况下,有必要限制使用私人执行机制,在其他情况下,有必要建立新的机制,更仔细地加以校准,以解决潜在的问题。因此,这一框架比一刀切的抽象方法更可取,这些方法涉及我们法律领域中对私人执法机制的限制的许多看似不同的辩论。通过对这些机制的各种争论提供一个系统的观点,这个框架为最终解决这些看似棘手的争端提供了希望。这一框架还试图为法官、机构和立法机构提供指导,使其能够根据实现公共监管目标而调整私人执法机制。
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