{"title":"Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty","authors":"Zachary S. Price","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2359685","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Recent Presidents have claimed wide-ranging authority to decline enforcement of federal laws. The Obama Administration, for example, has announced policies of abstaining from investigation and prosecution of certain federal marijuana crimes, postponing enforcement of key provisions of the Affordable Care Act, and suspending enforcement of removal statutes against certain undocumented immigrants. While these examples highlight how exercises of executive enforcement discretion — the authority to turn a blind eye to legal violations — may effectively reshape federal policy, prior scholarship has offered no satisfactory account of the proper scope of, and constitutional basis for, this putative executive authority. This Article fills that gap. Through close examination of the Constitution’s text, structure, and normative underpinnings, as well as relevant historical practice, this Article demonstrates that constitutional authority for enforcement discretion exists — but it is both limited and defeasible. Presidents may properly decline to enforce civil and criminal prohibitions in particular cases, notwithstanding their obligation under the Take Care Clause to ensure that “the Laws be faithfully executed.” Congress also may expand the scope of executive enforcement discretion by authorizing broader nonenforcement. But absent such congressional authorization, the President’s nonenforcement authority extends neither to prospective licensing of prohibited conduct nor to policy-based nonenforcement of federal laws for entire categories of offenders. Presuming such forms of executive discretion would collide with another deeply rooted constitutional tradition: the principle that American Presidents, unlike English kings, lack authority to suspend statutes or grant dispensations that prospectively excuse legal violations. This framework not only clarifies the proper executive duty with respect to enforcement of federal statutes but also points the way to proper resolution of other recurrent separation of powers issues.","PeriodicalId":47503,"journal":{"name":"Vanderbilt Law Review","volume":"67 1","pages":"671"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4000,"publicationDate":"2014-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"17","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Vanderbilt Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2359685","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Abstract
Recent Presidents have claimed wide-ranging authority to decline enforcement of federal laws. The Obama Administration, for example, has announced policies of abstaining from investigation and prosecution of certain federal marijuana crimes, postponing enforcement of key provisions of the Affordable Care Act, and suspending enforcement of removal statutes against certain undocumented immigrants. While these examples highlight how exercises of executive enforcement discretion — the authority to turn a blind eye to legal violations — may effectively reshape federal policy, prior scholarship has offered no satisfactory account of the proper scope of, and constitutional basis for, this putative executive authority. This Article fills that gap. Through close examination of the Constitution’s text, structure, and normative underpinnings, as well as relevant historical practice, this Article demonstrates that constitutional authority for enforcement discretion exists — but it is both limited and defeasible. Presidents may properly decline to enforce civil and criminal prohibitions in particular cases, notwithstanding their obligation under the Take Care Clause to ensure that “the Laws be faithfully executed.” Congress also may expand the scope of executive enforcement discretion by authorizing broader nonenforcement. But absent such congressional authorization, the President’s nonenforcement authority extends neither to prospective licensing of prohibited conduct nor to policy-based nonenforcement of federal laws for entire categories of offenders. Presuming such forms of executive discretion would collide with another deeply rooted constitutional tradition: the principle that American Presidents, unlike English kings, lack authority to suspend statutes or grant dispensations that prospectively excuse legal violations. This framework not only clarifies the proper executive duty with respect to enforcement of federal statutes but also points the way to proper resolution of other recurrent separation of powers issues.
最近几任总统都声称拥有广泛的权力来拒绝执行联邦法律。例如,奥巴马政府宣布了一些政策,包括放弃对某些联邦大麻犯罪的调查和起诉,推迟执行《平价医疗法案》(Affordable Care Act)的关键条款,暂停执行针对某些非法移民的遣返法规。虽然这些例子突出了行政执法自由裁量权的行使——对违法行为视而不见的权力——可能有效地重塑联邦政策,但之前的学术研究并没有提供令人满意的解释,说明这种假定的行政权力的适当范围和宪法基础。本文填补了这一空白。通过对宪法文本、结构和规范基础以及相关历史实践的仔细研究,本文表明,宪法赋予执法自由裁量权的权力是存在的——但它既是有限的,也是不可推翻的。总统可以适当地拒绝在特定情况下执行民事和刑事禁令,尽管他们有义务确保“法律得到忠实执行”。国会还可以通过授权更广泛的不强制执行来扩大行政执法自由裁量权的范围。但是,如果没有这样的国会授权,总统的非执法权既不能延伸到对被禁止行为的许可,也不能延伸到对所有类别的违法者基于政策的联邦法律的非执行。假定这种形式的行政自由裁量权将与另一个根深蒂固的宪法传统相冲突:与英国国王不同,美国总统没有权力暂停法规或授予可能为违法行为开脱的豁免。这一框架不仅明确了在执行联邦法规方面适当的行政责任,而且指出了适当解决其他反复出现的三权分立问题的途径。
期刊介绍:
Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc is an online forum designed to advance scholarly discussion. En Banc offers professors, practitioners, students, and others an opportunity to respond to articles printed in the Vanderbilt Law Review. En Banc permits extended discussion of our articles in a way that maintains academic integrity and provides authors with a quicker approach to publication. When reexamining a case “en banc” an appellate court operates at its highest level, with all judges present and participating “on the bench.” We chose the name “En Banc” to capture this spirit of focused review and provide a forum for further dialogue where all can be present and participate.