Baptizing O’Brien: Towards Intermediate Protection of Religiously Motivated Expressive Conduct

IF 2.4 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW Vanderbilt Law Review Pub Date : 2015-01-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2572857
Danielle Hay
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Abstract

Since its groundbreaking decision in Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court has maintained needlessly inconsistent standards of review for generally applicable laws that indirectly burden First Amendment–protected conduct. When a generally applicable law indirectly suppresses symbolic speech or expressive conduct, courts apply the O’Brien test, a carefully structured form of intermediate review. However, when an identical law suppresses religious conduct, under Smith, only rational basis review obtains. By applying intermediate scrutiny to laws that indirectly burden expressive conduct but a rational basis standard to laws that burden expressed belief, the Court has done exactly what it claims to be avoiding: it has subordinated religious belief to political and philosophical opinion.This Note traces the doctrinal roots of this assymetry, concluding that expressive conduct is often functionally indistinguishable from expressed belief. Acts of worship and the observance of sacrament, like expressive conduct, are the physical manifestation of deeply held, constitutionally protected beliefs. This Note then moves to two practical solutions. In the short term, creative advocates should plead free exercise and free speech claims in the alternative in an effort to obtain the heightened protection of free speech law. One example of this approach is Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, where the church argued (successfully) that allowing homeless persons to sleep on their steps was a “highly particularized, easily understood, religious and political message.” As a long-term solution, intermediate scrutiny should be the controlling standard of review, regardless of whether the font of expression is political opinion or religious conviction. An intermediate approach coheres with the original public meaning of the First Amendment and eliminates the need for the categorical exemptions that have developed under current case law.
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施洗奥布莱恩:宗教动机表达行为的中间保护
自“就业部门诉史密斯案”(Employment Division v. Smith)的开创性判决以来,最高法院对普遍适用的法律维持了不必要的不一致的审查标准,这些标准间接加重了受第一修正案保护的行为的负担。当一项普遍适用的法律间接抑制象征性言论或表达性行为时,法院采用奥布莱恩检验,这是一种结构严谨的中间审查形式。然而,当同一法律禁止宗教行为时,在史密斯看来,只有理性基础审查才能获得。法院对间接加重表达性行为负担的法律采用中间审查,而对加重表达性信仰负担的法律采用理性基础标准,这正是它声称要避免的:它使宗教信仰服从于政治和哲学意见。本笔记追溯了这种不对称的教义根源,得出的结论是,表达性的行为在功能上往往与表达的信仰难以区分。崇拜和遵守圣礼的行为,就像表达行为一样,是根深蒂固的、受宪法保护的信仰的身体表现。本文接着讨论两个实际的解决方案。在短期内,创造性的倡导者应该在替代方案中提出自由行使和言论自由的主张,以努力获得言论自由法律的高度保护。这种方法的一个例子是第五大道长老会教会诉纽约市案,该教会辩称(成功地)允许无家可归者睡在他们的台阶上是一种“高度具体、易于理解的宗教和政治信息”。作为一个长期的解决办法,中间审查应该是审查的控制标准,无论表达的字体是政治意见还是宗教信仰。中间方法与第一修正案最初的公共含义相一致,并消除了根据现行判例法发展起来的绝对豁免的必要性。
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期刊介绍: Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc is an online forum designed to advance scholarly discussion. En Banc offers professors, practitioners, students, and others an opportunity to respond to articles printed in the Vanderbilt Law Review. En Banc permits extended discussion of our articles in a way that maintains academic integrity and provides authors with a quicker approach to publication. When reexamining a case “en banc” an appellate court operates at its highest level, with all judges present and participating “on the bench.” We chose the name “En Banc” to capture this spirit of focused review and provide a forum for further dialogue where all can be present and participate.
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