Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation Protections for Attorney-Whistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime

IF 1.2 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW Yale Journal on Regulation Pub Date : 2016-01-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2620365
Jennifer M. Pacella
{"title":"Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation Protections for Attorney-Whistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime","authors":"Jennifer M. Pacella","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2620365","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Attorneys, especially in-house counsel, are subject to retaliation by employers in much the same way as traditional whistleblowers, often experiencing retaliation and loss of livelihood for reporting instances of wrongdoing about their clients. Although attorney-whistleblowing undoubtedly invokes ethical concerns, attorneys who “appear and practice” before the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) are required by federal law to act as internal whistleblowers under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) and report evidence of material violations of the law within the organizations that they represent. An attorney’s failure to comply with these obligations will result in SEC-imposed civil penalties and disciplinary action. Recent federal case law, however, holds that whistleblowers who report violations internally within their organizations are not eligible for the robust retaliation protections available under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) and must report to the SEC to be protected. Given that external reporting by attorneys would run contrary to professional ethical rules in a number of states, lawyers currently find themselves caught in a “catch-22” making it exceedingly difficult to comply with the conflicting regulatory regimes to which they are held. This Article will address this emerging problem by considering a question that no court has yet addressed — whether the SOX attorney-reporting rules preempt conflicting state law — and will propose amendments to such rules to clarify when external reporting is appropriate. This Article will also consider a state-based solution to this conflict adopting a modified version of Model Rule 1.13, the ethical rule governing the behavior of attorneys when they represent organizations and are called to act as whistleblowers. This Article will also contribute to the ongoing scholarly discussion of “new governance” approaches to regulation by placing attorney-whistleblowers in this context and considering how their gatekeeping role ensures regulatory compliance within the organizations that they represent.","PeriodicalId":46196,"journal":{"name":"Yale Journal on Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Yale Journal on Regulation","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2620365","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

Abstract

Attorneys, especially in-house counsel, are subject to retaliation by employers in much the same way as traditional whistleblowers, often experiencing retaliation and loss of livelihood for reporting instances of wrongdoing about their clients. Although attorney-whistleblowing undoubtedly invokes ethical concerns, attorneys who “appear and practice” before the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) are required by federal law to act as internal whistleblowers under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) and report evidence of material violations of the law within the organizations that they represent. An attorney’s failure to comply with these obligations will result in SEC-imposed civil penalties and disciplinary action. Recent federal case law, however, holds that whistleblowers who report violations internally within their organizations are not eligible for the robust retaliation protections available under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) and must report to the SEC to be protected. Given that external reporting by attorneys would run contrary to professional ethical rules in a number of states, lawyers currently find themselves caught in a “catch-22” making it exceedingly difficult to comply with the conflicting regulatory regimes to which they are held. This Article will address this emerging problem by considering a question that no court has yet addressed — whether the SOX attorney-reporting rules preempt conflicting state law — and will propose amendments to such rules to clarify when external reporting is appropriate. This Article will also consider a state-based solution to this conflict adopting a modified version of Model Rule 1.13, the ethical rule governing the behavior of attorneys when they represent organizations and are called to act as whistleblowers. This Article will also contribute to the ongoing scholarly discussion of “new governance” approaches to regulation by placing attorney-whistleblowers in this context and considering how their gatekeeping role ensures regulatory compliance within the organizations that they represent.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
冲突顾问:在不一致的监管制度下对律师举报人的报复保护
律师,尤其是内部律师,会像传统的举报人一样受到雇主的报复,经常因为举报客户的不法行为而遭到报复和失去生计。尽管律师举报无疑会引发道德问题,但根据《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》(“SOX”),联邦法律要求在证券交易委员会(“SEC”)面前“出庭和执业”的律师充当内部举报人,并报告其所代表的组织内部重大违法行为的证据。律师未能遵守这些义务将导致美国证券交易委员会施加民事处罚和纪律处分。然而,最近的联邦判例法认为,在其组织内部举报违规行为的举报人没有资格获得多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法(“多德-弗兰克”)规定的强有力的报复保护,必须向美国证券交易委员会报告才能得到保护。鉴于律师的外部报告与许多州的职业道德规则相违背,律师们目前发现自己陷入了“第22条军规”之中,这使得他们很难遵守他们所持有的相互冲突的监管制度。本文将通过考虑一个法院尚未解决的问题——SOX律师报告规则是否优先于相互冲突的州法律——来解决这个新出现的问题,并将对这些规则提出修正,以澄清外部报告何时是适当的。本文还将考虑采用修改版本的示范规则1.13的基于州的解决方案来解决这一冲突,示范规则1.13是管理律师在代表组织并被要求充当举报人时的行为的道德规则。本文还将通过将律师举报人置于这种背景下,并考虑他们的守门人角色如何确保他们所代表的组织内的法规遵从性,从而为正在进行的关于“新治理”监管方法的学术讨论做出贡献。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.80
自引率
3.60%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
FOIA’s Common Law Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the Restatement of Consumer Contract Law New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience Eliminating Conflicts of Interests in Banks: The Significance of the Volcker Rule
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1