{"title":"The Death Penalty & the Dignity Clauses","authors":"K. Barry","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2777847","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"“The question now to be faced is whether American society has reached a point where abolition is not dependent on a successful grass roots movement in particular jurisdictions, but is demanded by the Eighth Amendment.” Justice Thurgood Marshall posed this question in 1972, in his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia, which halted executions nationwide. Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia, a majority of the Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. Now, forty years after Gregg, the question is being asked once more. But this time seems different. That is because, for the first time in our Nation’s history, the answer is likely to be yes. The Supreme Court, with Justice Kennedy at its helm, is poised to declare the death penalty unconstitutional. No matter what the Court’s answer, one thing is certain: dignity will figure prominently in its decision. Dignity’s doctrinal significance has been much discussed in recent years, thanks in large part to the Supreme Court’s watershed decisions in U.S. v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges, which struck down laws prohibiting same-sex marriage as a deprivation of same-sex couples’ dignity under the Fourteenth Amendment. Few, however, have examined dignity as a unifying principle under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, which have long shared a commitment to dignity, and under the Court’s LGBT rights and death penalty jurisprudence, in particular, which give substance to this commitment. That is the aim of this Article. This Article suggests that dignity embodies three primary concerns — liberty, equality, and life. The triumph of LGBT rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the persistence of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment expose a tension in dignity doctrine: the most basic aspect of dignity (life) receives the least protection under the law. Because dignity doctrine demands liberty and equality for LGBT people, it must also demand an end to the death penalty. If dignity means anything, it must mean this. In anticipation of the Court’s invalidation of the death penalty on dignity grounds, this Article offers a framework to guide the Court, drawn from federal and state supreme court death penalty decisions new and old, statistics detailing the death penalty’s record decline in recent years, and the Court’s recent LGBT rights jurisprudence. It also responds to several likely counterarguments and considers abolition’s important implications for dignity doctrine under the Eighth Amendment and beyond.","PeriodicalId":51610,"journal":{"name":"Iowa Law Review","volume":"102 1","pages":"383"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Iowa Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2777847","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
“The question now to be faced is whether American society has reached a point where abolition is not dependent on a successful grass roots movement in particular jurisdictions, but is demanded by the Eighth Amendment.” Justice Thurgood Marshall posed this question in 1972, in his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia, which halted executions nationwide. Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia, a majority of the Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. Now, forty years after Gregg, the question is being asked once more. But this time seems different. That is because, for the first time in our Nation’s history, the answer is likely to be yes. The Supreme Court, with Justice Kennedy at its helm, is poised to declare the death penalty unconstitutional. No matter what the Court’s answer, one thing is certain: dignity will figure prominently in its decision. Dignity’s doctrinal significance has been much discussed in recent years, thanks in large part to the Supreme Court’s watershed decisions in U.S. v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges, which struck down laws prohibiting same-sex marriage as a deprivation of same-sex couples’ dignity under the Fourteenth Amendment. Few, however, have examined dignity as a unifying principle under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, which have long shared a commitment to dignity, and under the Court’s LGBT rights and death penalty jurisprudence, in particular, which give substance to this commitment. That is the aim of this Article. This Article suggests that dignity embodies three primary concerns — liberty, equality, and life. The triumph of LGBT rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the persistence of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment expose a tension in dignity doctrine: the most basic aspect of dignity (life) receives the least protection under the law. Because dignity doctrine demands liberty and equality for LGBT people, it must also demand an end to the death penalty. If dignity means anything, it must mean this. In anticipation of the Court’s invalidation of the death penalty on dignity grounds, this Article offers a framework to guide the Court, drawn from federal and state supreme court death penalty decisions new and old, statistics detailing the death penalty’s record decline in recent years, and the Court’s recent LGBT rights jurisprudence. It also responds to several likely counterarguments and considers abolition’s important implications for dignity doctrine under the Eighth Amendment and beyond.
“现在要面对的问题是,美国社会是否已经达到了这样一个地步:废除死刑不是依赖于特定司法管辖区成功的草根运动,而是第八修正案所要求的。”瑟古德·马歇尔大法官(Thurgood Marshall)在1972年对具有里程碑意义的弗曼诉格鲁吉亚案(Furman v. Georgia)的赞同意见中提出了这个问题,该案件在全国范围内暂停了死刑。四年后,在格雷格诉乔治亚州案中,最高法院的多数法官对这个问题作出了否定的回答。如今,在格雷格去世四十年后,这个问题再次被提出。但这一次似乎有所不同。这是因为,在我国历史上,答案很可能是肯定的。由肯尼迪大法官掌舵的最高法院准备宣布死刑违宪。无论法院的回答是什么,有一点是肯定的:尊严将在其决定中占据突出地位。近年来,尊严的教义意义受到了很多讨论,这在很大程度上要归功于最高法院在美国诉温莎案(U.S. v. Windsor)和奥贝格费尔诉霍奇斯案(Obergefell v. Hodges)中做出的具有分水岭意义的裁决,这些裁决推翻了根据宪法第十四修正案禁止同性婚姻的法律,认为这剥夺了同性伴侣的尊严。然而,很少有人将尊严作为《第八修正案》和《第十四修正案》中的统一原则加以审查,这两项修正案长期以来都对尊严作出了共同的承诺,特别是在最高法院的LGBT权利和死刑判例中,这为这一承诺提供了实质内容。这就是本文的目的。这篇文章认为尊严包含三个主要的关注点——自由、平等和生命。同性恋者权利在第十四修正案下的胜利和死刑在第八修正案下的持续存在暴露了尊严主义的紧张:尊严的最基本方面(生命)受到法律的保护最少。因为尊严主义要求LGBT人群享有自由和平等,它也必须要求废除死刑。如果尊严有什么意义,那一定是这个意思。鉴于预计最高法院将以尊严为由宣布死刑无效,本文从联邦和州最高法院新旧死刑判决、详细描述近年来死刑下降记录的统计数据以及最高法院最近的LGBT权利判例中,为最高法院提供了一个指导框架。它还回应了几个可能的反对意见,并考虑了废除第八修正案及其以外的尊严原则的重要含义。
期刊介绍:
Since its inception in 1915 as the Iowa Law Bulletin, the Iowa Law Review has served as a scholarly legal journal, noting and analyzing developments in the law and suggesting future paths for the law to follow. Since 1935, students have edited and have managed the Law Review, which is published five times annually. The Law Review ranks high among the top “high impact” legal periodicals in the country, and its subscribers include legal practitioners and law libraries throughout the world.