Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries

IF 1.2 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW Yale Journal on Regulation Pub Date : 2001-11-06 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.289849
Gregory Sidakt, Daniel F. Spulber
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引用次数: 22

Abstract

The competitive transformation of telecommunications and other network industries in the United States has caused governmental policy makers to be increasingly concerned with the fairness of the deregulatory process. This Essay offers a set of concrete guidelines that regulators of network industries should follow in removing regulatory controls: To achieve the productive and allocative benefits of competition and to ensure that the transition from regulation to competition is accomplished fairly, regulators should observe the principles of economic incentive, equal opportunity, and impartiality. Economic incentives allow incumbent firms to maintain their quality of service and innovation and investment, and allow them to recover stranded costs for past, present, and future regulatory obligations. Regulators can ensure equal opportunity by ensuring that regulation falls evenly on both competitive entrants and incumbents. Impartiality in increasing competition can be achieved by regulators refraining from market interventions that favor particular competitors. Only by treating incumbents and entrants symmetrically and resisting the temptation to manage competition will the regulators ensure that the deregulatory process in network industries will yield all of the benefits of market competition.
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网络产业的放松管制与管理竞争
美国电信业和其他网络行业的竞争性转变使政府决策者越来越关注解除管制过程的公平性。本文提供了网络行业监管者在取消监管控制时应遵循的一套具体指导方针:为了实现竞争的生产效益和配置效益,并确保从监管到竞争的过渡是公平完成的,监管者应遵守经济激励、机会平等和公正的原则。经济激励使现有公司能够保持其服务质量、创新和投资,并使它们能够收回过去、现在和未来监管义务的滞留成本。监管机构可以通过确保监管均匀地落在竞争性进入者和现有者身上,来确保机会均等。增加竞争的公正性可以通过监管机构避免偏袒特定竞争者的市场干预来实现。只有对称地对待现有者和进入者,并抵制管理竞争的诱惑,监管机构才能确保网络行业的放松管制过程将产生市场竞争的所有好处。
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CiteScore
2.80
自引率
3.60%
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0
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